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Emergence of new States usually is preceded by conflicts. The quest to establish less violent 
ways of solving territorial and or secessionist disputes led to this research, which examined the 
concept of secession, whether there is a right to secession under international law in light of the 
principle of territorial integrity of States. Towards answering the research question, the research 
explored concepts like self-determination, remedial secession, unilateral secession, and effects 
of membership or non-membership of the United Nations by an independent nation. The 
research aimed to establish the scope and extent of the right to self-determination under 
international law, and the remedies available to an oppressed minority group in a State if they 
chose to secede from the parent State as a result of the oppression. Topical active secessionist 
movements, especially in Africa and Europe were used as instances to highlight the different 
aspects of the right to self-determination and how Parent States react in the face of apparent or 
imminent assault on the territorial integrity of the respective States, with the Scottish scenario 
serving as a contemporary comparative model from which other secessionist agitations and 
States responses were viewed. The research was done using doctrinal research method which 
was based on the exposition, analysis, and critique of legal prepositions and doctrines as 
contained in legal texts and judicial decisions. 
The research showed that although there is an already established State practice which favours 
preservation of the territorial integrity of States, (unilateral) secession however, was not 
prohibited under international law, and new States are emerging as a result of secession. There 
is a right to external self-determination for all colonised and oppressed people, subject, in 
Africa, to certain limitations imposed by a case law. Finally, the research underscored the 
importance of the concept of remedial secession in issues related to oppressed minority 
population, and the fact that although an oppressed minority population can claim a right to 
remedial secession, secession itself, is more of a political than legal recourse, and any attempt 
to unilaterally secede without much international support may be an exercise in futility given 
the military might and coercive powers of a Parent State. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
 
1.1   Background 
 
 
 
At the end of the second world war, the United Nations
1 
was established to maintain 
world peace and ensure that events which led to the two previous world wars do not 
occur again so as not to have a third world war. The Charter establishing the UN in its 
article 1
2 
laid out the aims of the organisation to include among others, “relating with 
nations based on respect for the principles of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples.” Prior to the establishment of the UN, there was no legal procedure or laid 
down rules as to how nations become independent; States were won and lost by 
conquest, war, colonisation, etc. Since the League of Nations was unable to prevent 
World War II, the UN in its determination to ensure world peace and safeguard the 
fundamental rights of persons, recognised the right of peoples to self-determination in 
articles 1(2) and 55.
3
 
 
Secession is the withdrawal of a group from a larger group. This is usually used to 
denote  situations  relating  to  political  withdrawal  of  a  people  or  group  from  a 
sovereign State to form an independent State. In the past, people went to war on the 
slightest excuse, and a Sovereign can use lethal and disproportionate force to crush 
any dissident, uprising, or challenge to its territorial integrity through secession. Then, 
hardly will a State be held to account for its excessive use of force towards a minority 
or breakaway group. There were no institutions for that nor were there any strong 
international commitments in favour of broad fundamental human rights of people to 
choose  for  themselves  their  political  future  or  how  they  were  to  be  governed. 
However, in recent time, war, which used to be the predominant means of settling 
political disputes, has receded as new States are emerging without the drumbeats of 
war.  The  advent  of  the  United  Nations  after  WW  II  provided  stability  at  the 
international  scene.  It  offered  less  violent  ways  of  solving  political  conflicts  by 
 
 
 
1 
Hereinafter referred to as the UN 
2 
The Charter of the United Nations 
3 
ibid 
2 
 
recognising the right to self-determination in the Charter establishing the United 
Nations and in some human rights Covenants as well as establishing institutions for 
the effective implementation of its treaties and agreements. The UN also serves as a 
platform for gauging the independence of States by admitting to its membership only 
independent States. The UN being the main international body that brings together 
majority of the world’s independent countries, its recognition of States in the form of 
admission into the membership of the UN is an important element in discussions on 
State formation, and so will be considered as well in this research. 
 
 
1.2   Research Question 
 
 
 
Self-Determination, as a right, is a peremptory norm of international law which is 
recognised under the UN Charter and by the two international human rights 
Covenants.
4 
The scope and extent of the concept of self-determination, as enunciated 
in the UN Charter and the two Covenants, however, has been a source of controversy 
among jurists and legal scholars on the applicability of that right in specific situations. 
Understanding of the right to self-determination, in this work, will be narrowed to 
external self-determination and equated to a right to secede or to form an independent 
country out of an existing, invading or colonising State. In this research, the researcher 
will attempt to answer the question; whether there is a right to secession generally, 
under international law. In answering the above research question, the researcher will 
seek to answer sub-questions such as whether an oppressed minority population have 
the right to secede from its parent State; the lawfulness of unilateral declarations of 
independence under international law; and whether UN membership is a condition 
precedent for a successful secession or independence of a country. The research 
question will be considered in light of the territorial integrity principle of Member 
States of the UN, and international legal pathways for protecting minorities within 
States. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4  
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
3 
 
1.3   Methodology and Sources 
 
 
 
The researcher will adopt doctrinal research method in answering the above research 
questions in this thesis. The choice of doctrinal method in this research stems from the 
fact that the research will mostly be based on the exposition, analysis, and critique of 
legal prepositions and doctrines as contained in legal texts and judicial decisions. 
There are two primary law-creating processes under international law; custom and 
treaty.
5   
The  Statute  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice  listed  the  sources  of 
 
international law to include international conventions/ treaties; international customs; 
general principles of law recognised by civilised nations; and subject to certain 
conditions,
6 
judicial decisions and teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of 
the various nations.
7 
Judicial decisions and teachings of the most highly qualified 
publicists of the various nations serve as subsidiary sources while the rest are primary 
sources of international law. 
 
 
International treaties and customs, being the primary sources of international law will 
be used extensively in this research as the research is based on international law. In 
this wise, international law customs, charters, treaties, conventions and declarations 
including the United Nations Charter; the African Charter on Human and People’s 
Rights; the European Convention on Human Rights; the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights; the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights; Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries 
and  Peoples
8
;  and  any  other  international,  multinational,  or  regional  bodies’  law 
 
documents that dealt with or dwelt on secession and right to self-determination will be 
used. 
 
Reliance will also be placed on judicial pronouncements from international tribunals 
as they give effect to the provisions of treaties and customs of international law 
through judicial interpretation. Decisions from select international tribunals like the 
International  Court  of  Justice;
9   
European  Court  of  Human  Rights;
10   
and  African 
 
 
 
5 
Cassese A., International Law, 2
nd 
Ed (Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 198 
6 
Decisions from the ICJ has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that 
particular case. See art. 59 Statute of the International Court of Justice 
7 
Art. 38 (1) Statute of the International Court of Justice 
8 
Adopted by General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 
9 
Hereinafter referred to as “the ICJ” 
4 
 
Commission on Human Rights
11  
will be used as national discussions on secession in 
this research revolved mostly around Europe and Africa, and which are affected by 
decisions of the ECtHR and the ACHR respectively as well as the ICJ. General 
Comments as well as decisions of treaty bodies
12 
that concern the right to self- 
determination will also be used here as well. Decisions from national courts do not 
necessarily influence the development of international law, but such are pointers to the 
attitudes or sentiments with which national governments may implement their foreign 
policies or international obligations, which may in turn influence the development of 
international customs. Decisions from national courts are weak sources under 
international  law.  Nevertheless,  consideration  of  a  select  few  national  courts’ 
decisions will shed more light on secession discussions and the attitude of States 
towards agitation for secession within their borders. The research will also make use 
of peer reviewed articles and texts focusing on secession and right to self- 
determination  as  part  of  the  subsidiary  sources.  Finally,  a  few  selected  internet- 
sourced  materials  will  also  be  used  in  this  research,  although  internet-sourced 
materials have the least probative value in academic writings. 
 
 
1.4   Scope and Limitations 
 
 
 
This research is aimed at answering the question whether there is a right to secession 
under international law; whether an oppressed minority population have the right to 
secede from its parent State; the lawfulness of unilateral declarations of independence 
under international law and whether UN membership is a condition precedent for a 
successful secession or independence of a country. Discussions on secession will 
revolve around the right to self-determination, which in this case, is limited to external 
self-determination. External self-determination arises where a people, in the exercise 
of their right to self-determination, chooses to form a country of their own out of the 
existing country in which they were formerly subsumed. This research will not go into 
internal self-determination as it is beyond the scope of this work. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 
Hereinafter referred to as “the ECtHR” 
11 
Hereinafter referred to as “the ACHR” 
12 
Charged with monitoring the implementation of the above treaties. 
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Chapter 2: Attaining Statehood 
 
 
 
2.1   State Formation under International Law 
 
 
 
There are generally no laid down rules under international law as to how States are 
formed or become independent. Historically, States are formed through the imposition 
of a national language and a level of literacy, a common coinage, the fusing of a 
territory  into  a  single  time-space  system  through  innovations  in  transportation, 
communication and temporality, and the unification of legal codes and authority.
13
 
 
Prior to the First World War
14
, a State could come into being when a national 
movement secures independence, and other States acknowledging the established facts 
of statehood.
15  
This means that independence and recognition were the prerequisites 
for Statehood prior to World War I. It is unclear, however, the level of recognition 
required by the international community before a State could be deemed to have been 
properly formed. As there were no laid down rules for State formation, the practice of 
States in recognising or withdrawing recognition from States becomes important in 
determining State formation. The fact that not all sovereign States recognise a new 
State as sovereign does not in itself erode the sovereignty of that new State. States 
which recognise the independence of that new State would deal with the State as a 
sovereign, while States which fail to recognise the new State will either deal with the 
new State through intermediaries, have limited dealings with the new State, or decide 
to refrain from doing any business or having any dealings whatsoever with the new 
State. 
 
A new dawn on State formation emerged after World War I in 1919 with the Paris 
Peace Conference wherein the victorious allied powers met to form the League of 
Nations, and remap the boundaries of the defeated Central and Eastern European 
Countries. At the Peace Conference, boundaries were redrawn along ethnic lines, and 
 
 
 
 
13  
Rose N., and Miller P., “Political Power beyond the State: Problematics of Government”, in The 
British Journal of Sociology, vol. 43, No. 2, 1992, p. 176; Giddens A., The Nation State and Violence: 
Volume Two of a Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism, (Cambridge: Polity, 1985) 
14 
Hereinafter referred to WW I 
15    
Orentlicher  D.  F.,  “International  Responses  to  Separatist  Claims:  are  Democratic  Principles 
Relevant?”, in Macedo s. and Buchanan A., Secession and Self-Determination (Eds), (New York: New 
York University Press, NOMOS XLV, 2003), p. 21 
6 
 
disputed territories were resolved through internationally supervised plebiscites.
16 
The 
concept of plebiscite and redrawing of borders along ethnic or national lines were 
subtle recognition of self-determination principle as a guiding principle in State 
creation during the conference. Buoyed by this subtle recognition in the redrawing of 
the Central and Eastern European borders, Woodrow Wilson
17  
attempted to rally the 
other  allied  powers  to  incorporate  the  principles  of  self-determination  into  the 
covenant of the League of Nations.
18  
The intended incorporation will allow for such 
territorial readjustments, as may in the future become necessary by reason of changes 
in the then racial conditions and aspirations, or social and political relationships.
19 
The 
proposal was unpopular with the other allied powers as there was general apathy 
towards secession at the time, and so it failed. 
 
 
With the proposal’s failure, self-determination was not considered to be an 
international legal norm, the principle having been used once prior to World War II in 
the  remapping  of  the  Central  and  Eastern  European  Countries,  and  therefore  an 
isolated case. There were some national movements and countries at the time that 
sought to take advantage of Wilson’s proposal on self-determination without 
succeeding.  In  the Aaland  Islands  Question
20
,  for instance,  representatives  of the 
Aaland Islands
21  
at the Paris Peace Conference, sought the annexation of Aaland 
 
Islands to Sweden. The application of the Aaland Islands’ representatives were 
premised on the ground that the Aaland Islands were previously part of the Swedish 
kingdom before the Islands were conquered by Russia in 1809. They based their 
agitation on the “the right of peoples to self-determination as enunciated by President 
Wilson”.22 At the time Russia conquered and annexed the Aaland Islands, Finland was 
part of Russia as an autonomous Grand Duchy. Upon annexation, Aaland Islands 
became part of the Grand Duchy of Finland within the Russian empire. With the 
declaration of independence from Russia in 1917 by Finland, Aaland Islands came 
under Finland’s direct rule, hence the national movement by the Aaland Islands to re- 
 
 
16 
Orentlicher D. F., art. Cit., p. 21 
17 
28
th 
President of the United States 
18 
Orentlicher D. F., art. Cit., p. 21 
19  
Wilson W., “Covenant (Wilson’s First Draft)”, in Miller D. H., The Drafting of the Covenant, vol. 2 
(New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1928), p. 12 
20  
The Aaland Islands Question: Report Submitted to the Council of the League of Nations by the 
Commission of Rapporteurs, League of Nations Doc. B7.21/68/106 (1921), 27 
21 
Which were part of Finland on Finland’s independence from Russia in 1919 
22 
Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference 1919, vol. 
4 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Press Office, 1943), p. 172 
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join the Kingdom of Sweden. Finland argued that Aaland Islands was incorporated
23 
as a territory under the Grand Duchy of Finland
24  
which gained independence from 
the Russian empire in 1917. According to Finland, any decision on this issue would 
amount to an interference with the sovereignty of Finland as it is a matter which, 
under international law, falls within its domestic jurisdiction. Sweden, on the other 
hand, espoused the position that the inhabitants of the Islands be allowed to determine 
their political status through a plebiscite in line with the propositions of President 
Wilson. 
 
Confronted with these thorny issues of sovereignty over domestic issues and self- 
determination, the newly established League of Nations appointed a Committee and a 
Commission to look into the Aaland Islands matter. They were the Committee of 
Jurists to Determine Whether the League of Nations was Competent to Consider the 
Petition Filed by the Representatives of Aaland Islands against Finland; and a 
Commission of Rapporteurs to Assess the Merits of the Petition Filed by Sweden on 
the Aaland Island Question.
25  
The Committee and the Commission came up with 
 
identical reports to the effect that the principle of free determination was not, properly 
speaking, a rule of international law
26
, even though it played an important part in 
modern political philosophy
27
. The Committee of Jurists opined that if there were to 
be a manifest and continued abuse of a State’s sovereignty against a minority 
population, such scenario will be proper to bring an international dispute arising from 
the domestic scenario within the competence of the League of Nations.
28 
This thus left 
open the possibility of a remedial secession where a State continually abuses its 
sovereignty over its minority populations, or as a last resort when the State lacks 
either  the  will  or  the  power  to  enact  and  apply just  and  effective  guarantees  of 
minority rights
29
. The two reports ended agitations for incorporation of self- 
determination as a principle of international law under the defunct League of Nations, 
even though their conclusions established a possibility for remedial self-determination 
when a Parent State fails in its duties towards its minority populations. 
 
23 
Orentlicher D. F., art. Cit., p. 40 
24 
The predecessor to the modern State of Finland 
25 
Orentlicher D. F., art. Cit., p. 40 
26 
The Aaland Islands Question, p. 28 
27 
“Report of the International Committee of Jurists Entrusted by the Council of the League of Nations 
with the Task of Giving an Advisory Opinion upon the Legal Aspects of the Aaland Island Question,” 
League of Nations Official Journal, supp. 3 (1920), p. 9 
28 
Report of the International Committee of Jurists, p. 5 
29 
The Aaland Islands Question, p. 28 
8 
 
The decolonisation policy of the United Nations resulted in a dramatic increase in the 
number of independent and Sovereign States right after the Second World War. The 
decolonisation policy led to several colonies and overseas territories asserting their 
right to self-determination, gaining independence and acceding to the membership of 
the United Nations. From original membership of 51 sovereign nations, the United 
Nations now boasts of membership of 193 independent States.
30  
Majority of these 
newly established States, post-World War II
31
, became independent as a result of the 
 
right to self-determination clause contained in the UN Charter, and the UN’s resolve 
 
to pursue decolonisation as one of its major aims. 
 
 
Apart from the UN’s decolonisation drive, some States emerged as a result of the 
dissolution of a parent State. This is evident in the dissolution of the former Union of 
Soviet Socialist States
32 
into 15 independent States,
33 
and the former Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia which dissolved into 7 independent States
34
. Also, new States 
 
had been known to emerge through the merging of 2 or more previously independent 
States. This was evident in the merging of the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
German Democratic Republic
35 
to form the present Federal Republic of Germany. 
 
In other cases, nationalist movements may engage a parent State in warfare which 
may culminate in the declaration of independence by the nationalists. The Sudanese 
civil wars which lasted for decades is a good example as the Southern Sudan engaged 
the Northern Sudan in a civil war demanding for representation in government and 
regional autonomy.
36  
The outcome of the Sudanese civil wars was the independence 
of South Sudan in 2011 and accession as the 193
rd  
Member State of the United 
 
 
 
30  
Growth in United Nations Membership, 1945-present, http://www.un.org/en/sections/member- 
states/growth-united-nations-membership-1945-present/index.html,  accessed   on   17/03/2018   at 
16:21 
31 
Hereinafter referred to as “the WW II” 
32 
Abbreviated to USSR 
33 
Walker E. W., Dissolution: Sovereignty and the breakup of the Soviet Union (Rowman & Littlefield, 
2003), p. 2. The States that emerged out of the defunct USSR in 1991 include Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, MOLDOVA, Russia, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. 
34    
Laurent  J.  C.,  &  Melady  T.,  “The  Seven  States  of  the  Former  Yugoslavia:  An  Evaluation”, 
https://www.iwp.edu/news_publications/detail/the-seven-states-of-the-former-yugoslavia-an- 
evaluation, accessed on 17/03/2018 at 18:15. The States that previously belonged to the defunct 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia are Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, 
Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia. 
35 
Which at the time were both independent countries and were admitted into the UN in 1973 
36  
Poggo S., The First Sudanese Civil War: Africans, Arabs, and Israelis in the Southern Sudan, 1955- 
1972 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 113 
9 
 
Nations. The Eritreans went to war against Ethiopia which lasted for 30 years when 
the latter annexed the former in 1962. Eritrea was established by the United Nations as 
an autonomous region under a federal arrangement within Ethiopia in 1952
37
, but the 
subsequent annexation a decade later abolished its autonomy thereby sparking the 30 
year civil war.
38 
The Eritreans were able to drive away the Ethiopian forces from their 
land, and subsequently declared independence from Ethiopia on April 27, 1993 
following a referendum conducted and supervised by the United Nations Observer 
Mission to Verify the Referendum in Ethiopia
39
.    East Timor
40  
too gained 
independence from Indonesia after a civil war with the later.
41
 
 
It is pertinent to note, however, that not all wars for secession or self-determination 
succeed or eventually lead to total independence and recognition by the United 
Nations. For instance, the then Eastern Region of Nigeria engaged in a 30 months civil 
war of independence against the Nigerian State wherein it unilaterally proclaimed an 
independent State known as the Republic of Biafra with Enugu as its capital. The new 
Biafran State was short-lived as it was subsequently re-annexed by Nigeria in January 
1970 after the capitulation of the Biafran forces. 
 
 
 
2.2   State Membership of the United Nations 
 
 
 
A State is deemed as properly constituted, if the State possesses certain attributes that 
identifies a State. The attributes include permanent population; defined territory; 
government; and capacity to enter into legal relations.
42 
A State must be composed of 
a population ruled by a government, and residing within a defined territory over which 
the State exercises sovereignty to the exclusion of other States or sovereigns. Prior to 
WW II, the presence of the above four characteristics is all that is needed for a State to 
be  deemed  independent  and  sovereign,  in  addition  to  recognition  by  some  other 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37
UN, The United Nations and the Independence of Eritrea (The UN Blue Books Series, Vol XII), p. 4 
38 
Ibid 
39 
Otherwise referred to as UNOVER 
40 
Also known as Timor-Leste 
41 
Hainsworth P., From Occupation and Civil War to Nation-Statehood: East Timor and the Struggle for 
Self-Determination and Freedom from Indonesia (IBIS Discussion Paper No. 5, Patterns of Conflict 
Resolution, University College Dublin) 
42 
Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 1933 
10 
 
States.
43 
However, with the advent of the United Nations in 1945 after WW II, a new 
chapter on State creation, recognition and consular relations emerged. In addition to 
possessing the four criteria of a State, a modern State must also seek membership of 
the United Nations
44  
by seeking the recognition and support of other Member-States 
of the organisation. Article 4 (1) of the United Nations Charter stipulates that 
 
 
Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving 
states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter 
and, in the judgment of the Organisation, are able and willing to carry 
out these obligations.
45
 
 
The rise in UN’s membership over the years is a pointer to the fact that more States 
have seceded, gained all the attributes of a State, and gotten the recognition of the UN 
as a Member State of that organisation. The 193
rd 
Member State, South Sudan seceded 
from the Republic of Sudan in 2011 and was formally admitted into the UN on 14
th
 
 
July 2011 as a sovereign Member State.
46 
Admission of new States as Member States 
of the organisation is usually in two-fold; recognition of a State’s independence by the 
UN Security Council, and recommendation to the General Assembly that the 
independent State be admitted as a Member State.
47  
Both steps are mandatory and 
must be fulfilled before accession to UN membership. Upon application by a 
prospective State, the UN Security Council’s 5 permanent members together with at 
least 4 non-permanent members must approve the application and recommend to the 
General Assembly that the State be admitted into the UN.
48  
Where, however, any of 
the permanent members object or abstain from voting on the application, the 
application will fail. Upon a successful recommendation by the Security Council, the 
General Assembly’s vote admitting a prospective State as a member of the United 
Nations must be by two-thirds majority vote. 
 
 
 
 
43  
Although this recognition, stricto sensu, was not a prerequisite for State formation in the past, as 
States which fail to recognise any particular State as a sovereign either go to war with the said State or 
refuse to have dealings with that State 
44 
Cohen R., “The Concept of Statehood in United Nations Practice”, in University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review, Vol. 109, No. 1961, p. 1129 
45 
Article 4 (1) UN Charter 
46 
https://news.un.org/en/story/2011/07/381552-un-welcomes-south-sudan-193rd-member-state, 
accessed on 23/03/2018 at 9:04 
47 
Article 4 (2) UN Charter provides that “The admission of any such State to membership in the United 
Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the 
Security Council.” 
48           
“About       UN       Membership”,       http://www.un.org/en/sections/member-states/about-un- 
membership/index.html, accessed on 23/03/2018 at 9:57 
11 
 
The status of “Permanent Observer” to the United Nations does not correspond to 
membership of the organisation. The Permanent Observer status was not provided for 
in the UN Charter; it is merely a practice, first adopted in 1946 when the then UN 
Secretary-General accepted the designation of the Swiss Government as a Permanent 
Observer to the United Nations.
49  
Permanent Observer status is available to non- 
 
Member States of the United Nations who belong to one or more specialised agencies 
of the UN, and who apply, or are put forth by a UN member State, to be accepted as a 
Permanent Observer to the United Nations. Permanent Observers participate in most 
meetings of the United Nations, and the specialised agencies to which they belong, 
and  are  entitled  to  the  necessary  documentations.  However,  Permanent  Observer 
States are not entitled to any voting rights in the General Assembly as they are non- 
members. The Permanent Observers are merely observers observing the proceedings 
of the General Assembly. There are currently two Permanent Observer States at the 
UN; The Holy See and the Palestine. 
 
Permanent Observer State status may be preferred when full membership of the UN is 
contentious and may not survive the Security Council’s recommendation vote. This is 
the case with the application made by President Mahmoud Abbas of Palestine to the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations on 23
rd 
September 2011 for the admission of 
the Palestine State as a full member of the UN.
50  
Prior to this application, Palestine 
enjoyed the status of “Observer Entity” at the UN, which is not so different from the 
Permanent Observer status that the Holy See enjoys. Palestine was thereafter admitted 
to  the  United  Nations  Education,  Scientific,  and  Cultural  Organisation,
51   
as  a 
Member-State. The application for membership in the UN was however defeated at 
the UN Security Council by the “NO” vote of the United States52  on the issue. All 
applications for membership of the UN need the support of all the five permanent 
Members of the Security Council to succeed, even if all the other non-members voted 
in favour. Following the defeat at the Security Council, the General Assembly, rather 
 
 
 
 
 
 
49  
“About Permanent Observers”, http://www.un.org/en/sections/member-states/about-permanent- 
observers/index.html, accessed on 23/03/2018 at 11:23 
50  
Cerone J., “Legal Implications of the UN General Assembly Vote to Accord Palestine the Status of 
Observer State”, in American Society of International Law, vol. 16, Iss. 37, 2012, 
51 
UNESCO 
52 
The United States, along with China, France, Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland are permanent members of the Security Council. 
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voted
53  
for the recognition of Palestine as a “Non-Member Permanent Observer” to 
the United Nations. The resolution passed by more than the two-third majority,
54 
which was required for full membership, had it been the application was successful at 
the Security Council. 
 
 
Palestine’s Statehood bid at the United Nations was blocked by the United States 
exercising its veto against the resolution to recommend Palestine to the General 
Assembly to be admitted as a UN Member State. Giving the Statehood bid’s failure, it 
presupposes, in a way, that in the face of international law, Palestine is not a State or 
has not totally achieved statehood. Going by the Montevideo criteria, this could mean 
that it has not totally fulfilled the four requirements for Statehood. Palestine has 
permanent population and a government led by President Mahmoud Abbas. To an 
extent, it could be argued that it also has the power to enter into legal relations.
55
 
 
Definite   territory   requirement,   is   however,   highly   contentious   in   the   peace 
negotiations between the State of Israel and Palestine. While Palestine canvasses the 
view that the border between Israel and the future Palestine State should be based on 
the 1967 borders
56 
before any peace negotiation between the two sides could be 
meaningful,
57  
Israel maintains that there should not be any precondition
58  
to peace 
talks between the two sides. The outstanding border issue made it improbable to 
conclude  that  Palestine  fulfilled  the  four  Montevideo  criteria  for  Statehood.  The 
failure to get the recognition of UN by becoming a member of the organisation is a 
confirmation  of  the  fact  that  in  the  eyes  of  international  law,  Palestine  is  not  a 
sovereign State. 
 
 
 
 
53  
A/RES/67/19 Resolution Adopted at the 44
th  
Plenary of the United Nations’ General Assembly on 
the Status of Palestine in the United Nations, adopted on 29
th 
November 2012, 
54 
Out of the 193 Member States, 138 voted in favour, 9 States voted against, while 41 States 
abstained, and 5 States did not record any vote at all. 
55 
As a Member-State of UNESCO and a permanent observer to the United Nations, Palestine has the 
legal capacity to enter into legal relations. Without such capacity, it wouldn’t have been possible to 
admit it into UNESCO or as a permanent observer. Capacity is sine qua non to the validity of any legal 
document or contract which creates binding rights and obligations to the parties therein. 
56 
The 1967 borders were the borders that existed prior to the 6-day war between Israel and its Arab 
neighbours of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. Israel emerged victorious from the war, and as a result, it 
consolidated territories which hitherto were in control of the Palestinians. Oren M. B., Six Days of 
War: June 1967 and the Making of Modern Middle East, (Presidio Press, 2017), 
57 
SC/13213 Security Council’s 8183
rd 
meeting, “Palestinian President Presents Plan to Relaunch Peace 
Talks with Israel, says New Multilateral Mechanism should Guide Process, in Briefing to Security 
Council”, available on https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13213.doc.htm, accessed on 24/03/2018 
at 22:03 
58 
Fixing the border between the two sides to the 1967 borders 
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An alternative proposition to the above Palestinian scenario
59 
could be summed up 
thus: Had it been that the United States allowed the Statehood bid of Palestine at the 
UN to succeed, and Palestine was admitted as a Member-State of the organisation 
even though it failed to fulfil the four Montevideo criteria on the characteristics of a 
State, would its UN’s membership be taken to have cured whatever defect Palestine 
had in its creation?  In other words, can UN membership confer independence on an 
otherwise non-independent territory? It is noteworthy to point out here that the UN 
does not recognise a State as it lacks the power to do so. The act of recognition under 
international law rests with States and governments, as recognition implies readiness 
to  assume  diplomatic  relations.  The  United  Nations  is  neither  a  State  nor  a 
government that is capable of recognising other States or governments. What it merely 
does is to admit or refuse to admit to its membership, other independent and peace- 
loving States,
60 
since it is an organisation of independent States. 
 
 
Since its formation, the UN has mostly operated with respect to the territorial integrity 
and  sovereignty  of  Member  States  over  domestic  issues.
61   
In  fact,  respect  for 
territorial integrity is one of its guiding principles in the pursuit of its purposes. 
Generally, admitting a non-independent territory as a Member by the UN will be 
tantamount to interfering with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Parent 
State as that will mean internationalising an issue which falls under the domestic 
jurisdiction of the Parent Member State. However, where the UN admits such a non- 
independent territory as a member, such admission will have the effect of conferring 
independence on the non-independent territory in the eyes of international law. This is 
because, the UN itself is an organisation of peace-loving independent States
62
. That 
being the case, UN membership is seen as recognition of the fact of independence of a 
territory by the Member States of the UN and a willingness to enter into diplomatic 
relations with the new State. Therefore, UN membership cures any non-compliance 
with  the  four  Montevideo  criteria  or  whatever  defect  that  there  may  be  in  the 
formation of a new country. Taking the example of the proposed State of Palestine 
further,  full  membership  of  the  UN  by  Palestine  will  have  automatically  made 
 
 
 
59 
Which did not meet the four Montevideo criteria on the characteristics of a State 
60 
Article 4 (1) UN Charter 
61  
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter states that “all Member states shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.” 
62 
Article 4 (1) UN Charter 
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Palestine an independent country even if the four Montevideo criteria on Statehood 
had not been met. 
 
 
2.3   Significance of Non-membership of the United Nations 
 
 
 
As earlier pointed out, an independent State must possess the four attributes 
enumerated in the Montevideo Convention which includes permanent population, 
defined territory, government, and capacity to enter into legal relations. A territory 
may possess the above four criteria and yet may not be independent. This is usually 
the case where a territory is given limited or regional autonomy by the Parent State on 
some issues, usually with the exclusion of foreign affairs. For instance, the Aaland 
Islands in Finland enjoys some degree of autonomy from the Finnish State but lacks 
the powers to engage in foreign relations. This is also the case with Catalans in Spain. 
Independence confers legal personality on territories under international law and gives 
them the capacity to enter into diplomatic and legal relations with other independent 
States.  It  also  entitles  States  to  seek  the membership  of the United Nations.  All 
Member States of the United Nations are independent States, but not all independent 
States are Member States of the United Nations. The UN Charter even recognised the 
fact that not all independent States may be Member States of the UN as membership is 
limited to only peace-loving independent States that accepted the Charter obligations 
and are admitted as a Member State of the UN.
63  
There may be independent States 
 
who fail to accede to the Charter obligations and who may be unwilling to carry out 
the obligations under the Charter. There may also be other independent countries that 
are not peace-loving even though they indicated interest and are desirous of acceding 
to the UN membership, but due to the Charter provisions on membership, they are not 
admitted as members. The above countries may be independent and sovereign without 
acceding to the UN membership. There are some de facto independent States which 
are yet to become Member States of the UN or permanent observers thereof, but are 
recognised by at least one Member State of the UN as an independent country. They 
include Republic of China
64
,  Sahrawi  Arab  Democratic  Republic,  Kosovo,  South 
 
Ossetia, and Northern Cyprus. 
 
 
 
 
63 
Article 4 (1) UN Charter 
64 
ROC otherwise called Taiwan 
15 
 
The above listed de facto independent States had at one time or the other sought 
membership of the United Nations and recognition by its members without success. 
The Republic of China and People’s Republic of China65 laid claim to being the sole 
legitimate  government  of China
66   
and  sought  recognition  from  other independent 
 
countries and Membership of the United Nations. The People’s Republic of China was 
 
recognised by the United Nations as the legitimate government of China with about 
 
169 countries having diplomatic relations with PRC compared to 23 countries that 
recognises the ROC.
67  
As a result of diminished diplomatic recognition, the ROC no 
longer contends representing mainland China, and has since shifted its position to dual 
recognition of both the ROC and the PRC as legitimate governments representing two 
independent countries. The PRC, on the other hand continues to maintain one-China 
policy, treating Taiwan
68  
as part and parcel of Chinese territory to which the PRC is 
the only legitimate government. 
 
 
In  the  case  of  Sahrawi  Arab  Democratic  Republic,  otherwise  known  as  Western 
Sahara, the area was a former Spanish colony bordered to the South of Morocco, 
North and West of Mauritania, and Southwest of Algeria with an estimated population 
of about 300,000 inhabitants.
69 
The Spaniards pulled out in 1975 without granting 
independence to the colony neither did it hand over the area to any other country. As a 
result, Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania claimed ownership of the area, while the 
tribal  inhabitants  of  the  area  assert  their  right  to  self-determination  and 
independence.
70  
At present, Morocco is in possession of the area, but the African 
Union treats Western Sahara as an independent country by admitting it as a Member- 
State of the Union despite Morocco’s protests. 
 
In the case of Kosovo, following ethnic tensions between Serbia and Albanian 
Kosovars and failure of European Union backed negotiations, the Kosovar legislature 
voted   overwhelmingly   in   favour   of   seceding   from   Serbia   and   declared   its 
independence on 17
th 
February 2008, even though Serbia contests the validity of such 
 
 
 
 
65 
PRC 
66  
Rich T. S., “Status for Sale: Taiwan and the Competition for Diplomatic Recognition”, in Issues & 
Studies 45, No. 4, December 2009, pp. 159-188 
67
Ibid, p. 160 
68 
The ROC controls Taiwan. 
69 
Jensen E., Western Sahara: Anatomy of a Stalemate (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), p. 14 
70 
Ibid, 
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unilateral declaration of independence.  Although Russia and China
71  
support Serbia 
in its claim against Kosovo, a number of countries, led by the West and European 
Union Member States, continue to recognise Kosovo as an independent State. At 
present, there are about 116 countries that has recognised Kosovo as an independent 
State and established relations with it.
72
 
 
In the South Caucasus, both Abkhazia and South Ossetia were former Georgian 
territories which respectively declared independence from Georgia following ethnic 
tensions in 1994 and 1992. Initially, Russia was hesitant to recognise both Republics 
as independent States. However, following the Russo-Georgian war in 2008 and some 
months after the West recognised the unilateral declaration of independence by 
Kosovo, Russia formally recognised Abkhazia and South Ossetia as sovereign States 
and called on the West and other countries to do same. Highlighting the significance 
of  Kosovar’s  recognition,  Russian  President,  Vladimir  Putin,  speaking  at  CIS73 
 
summit in Moscow declared that 
 
 
The Kosovo precedent is a terrible precedent. Essentially it is blowing 
up the whole system of international relations which has evolved over 
the past not even decades but centuries. Undoubtedly, it might provoke 
a whole chain of unpredictable consequences. Those who are doing 
this, relying exclusively on force and having their satellites submit to 
their will, are not calculating the results of what they are doing. 
Ultimately this is a stick with two ends, and one day the other end of 
this stick will hit them on their heads.
74
 
 
Russia and its allies maintained that Kosovar’s unilateral declaration of independence 
was in breach of international law
75
, and its recognition by the West was 
unprecedented. That being the case, Russia contended that same recognition should be 
extended to Abkhazia and South Ossetia since they were all in the same boat, stressing 
that  what  was  good  for  the  goose  should  also  be  good  for  the  gander.  That 
notwithstanding,  only  a  few  countries  recognise  Abkhazia  and  South  Ossetia  as 
 
 
 
71 
Both Russia and China are permanent members of the UN Security Council and may veto any future 
application for membership of the UN by Kosovo, just like the United States vetoed that of Palestine. 
72 
https://www.kosovothanksyou.com/, accessed on 02/04/2020 at 13:30 
73  
Commonwealth of Independent States, which is a loose confederation of 9 Member States and 2 
associate States members, which were all former Soviet Republics, formed during the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union. 
74 
BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 2008; Toal G., “Russia’s Kosovo: A Critical Geopolitics of the August War 
Over South Ossetia”, in Eurasian Geography and Economics, vol. 50 Issue 1, 2009, p. 14 
75   
Even  though  the  ICJ  ruled  afterwards  that  unilateral  declarations  of  independence,  without 
infringement of any jus cogens, were not prohibited under international law. 
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independent. No Western country recognises the duo, but rather views them as still 
within the territorial jurisdiction of Georgia. 
 
The same problem of non-recognition which afflicts others
76 
also afflicts the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus. The Republic declared its independence, unilaterally, 
from the Republic of Cyprus in 1983 and assumed the name Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus following ethnic tensions and Turkey’s invasion of Northern Cyprus. 
The  rest  of  Cyprus  comprised  mainly  ethnic  Greek  Cypriots.  The  UN  Security 
Council issued several resolutions condemning the unilateral declaration of 
independence by the Turkish Cypriots and declaring it legally invalid.
77  
It called on 
UN Member States not to recognise the Republic as a Sovereign State. Turkey, 
however, is the only UN Member State that recognises the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus despite the UN Security Council’s condemnation. Following the 
ICJ’s Advisory Opinion to the UN General Assembly in Kosovo’s unilateral 
declaration of independence,
78 
it is correct to state that unilateral declarations of 
independence are not generally prohibited under international law. That being the 
case, it is logical to posit also that there is no general prohibition of secession under 
international law. Whether there is an enforceable right to secession however is a 
different  issue  which  will  be  discussed  in  the  succeeding  chapter  under  self- 
determination. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
76 
Kosovo stands out from the rest as it enjoys significant recognition from a majority of UN Member 
States, but short of UN membership. 
77    
For   instance   SC/Res/541   reaffirming  the   invalidity   of   the   purported   declaration  of   the 
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by the Republic of Turkey of the purported secession of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and 
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78   
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Chapter 3: Self-determination leading to State Formation 
 
 
 
3.1   The Right to Self-determination 
 
 
 
As already stated above, self-determination as a concept came to light immediately 
after World War I during the remapping of the defeated Central and Eastern Europe 
and President Wilson’s futile bid to elevate it to an international norm at the time. 
Self-determination, however, transformed from a principle unrecognised under 
international law in the heydays of the League of Nations to a right protected under 
the United Nations Charter. With this recognition under the UN Charter also came a 
transformation in the understanding of what self-determination entails; rights of 
colonised peoples to determine for themselves their political future, as against the 
general application to all persons as espoused by President Wilson in 1919. 
 
The principle of self-determination was thus established as an international norm 
under the purposes and guiding principles of the UN. Article 1 (2) of the UN Charter 
provides as one of the purposes of the UN “To develop friendly relations among 
nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace”.79 The 
 
above provision outlines self-determination of peoples, however, nowhere in the 
Charter was the term “people” defined so as to fully appreciate the category of persons 
the self-determination principle is applicable to. Different authors proffer different 
definitions on the concept of “people”. Some authors posit that the term “people” 
refers to the population living within a political unit
80
, while others view it from the 
perspective of ethnicity,  nationality,  and  shared  attributes.
81      
The United Nations 
 
Educational,  Scientific  and  Cultural  Organisation
82   
in  1989/  1990  attempted  a 
 
comprehensive definition of the term “people” to mean 
 
 
 
 
 
79 
Ch. 1, art. 1(2) Charter of the United Nations 
80  
Cassese A., UN Law, Fundamental Rights (Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1979), p. 150; Higgins R., The 
Development  of  International  Law  through  the  Political  Organs  of  the  United  Nations  (Oxford 
University Press 1963), p. 119 
81 
Brownlie I., “The Rights of Peoples in Modern International Law”, in Crawford J. (ed.), The Rights of 
Peoples (Clarendon Press, 1988), p. 5; Dinstein Y., “Collective Human Rights of Peoples and Minorities” 
(1976) 25 International and Comparative Law Quarterly, p. 104 
82 
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1. a group of individual human beings who enjoy some or all of the 
following  common  features:  (a)  a  common  historical  tradition;  (b) 
racial or ethnic identity; (c) cultural homogeneity; (d) linguistic unity; 
(e) religious or ideological affinity; (f) territorial connection; (g) 
common economic life; 2. The group must be of a certain number 
which need not be large (e.g. the people of micro States) but which 
must be more than a mere association of individuals within a State; 3. 
The group as a whole must have the will to be identified as a people or 
the consciousness of being a people -allowing that groups or some 
members of such grows, though sharing the foregoing characteristics, 
may not have that will or consciousness; and possibly, 4. The group 
must  have  institutions  or  other  means  of  expressing  its  common 
characteristics and will for identity.
83
 
 
Depending on the context in which the term is used, the term “people” can refer to a 
whole lot of groups; from people who share common attributes, to people living 
within the same geographical area, political unit, continent etc.
84 
From whatever 
perspective a person is approaching the definition of the term “people”, the concept of 
self-determination of peoples as provided for under the UN Charter encompasses all. 
That notwithstanding, for the purposes of this research, the term “people” is taken to 
mean a group of people who identify themselves as belonging to the same ethnic 
group or constituting a nation, and who share certain similar attributes of language, 
culture, geographic location, etc. The above understanding of the meaning of “people” 
will guide the researcher in the further elucidation of the right to self-determination in 
this research, and the terms “people”, “ethnic group”, or “nation” may be used 
interchangeably in the course of this work. 
 
In Chapter IX of the UN Charter that dealt with International Economic and Social 
Co-operation, article 55 lists several goals the organisation would pursue “with a view 
to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for 
peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of 
equal rights and self-determination of peoples….”85 Going further in article 73 which 
dealt with non-self-governing territories,  there was an implied reference to self- 
determination wherein it was affirmed in the article that 
 
 
 
 
 
83  
UNESCO, “International Meeting of Experts on Further Study of the Concept of the Right of the 
Peoples” (22 February 1990) SHS-89/CONF 602/7, pp. 7-8 
84 
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85 
Art. 55 Charter of the United Nations 
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[m]embers of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities 
for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained 
a full measure of self-government recognize the principle that the 
interests  of  the  inhabitants  of  these  territories  are  paramount,  and 
accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost, within 
the  system  of  international  peace  and  security  established  by  the 
present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories 
[…].86 
 
Again, there was a subtle reference to self-determination in the UN Charter as seen in 
article 76 (b). The article provides for, as one of the basic objectives of the trusteeship 
system, the promotion of political, economic, social, and educational advancement of 
the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self- 
government or independence in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the 
people concerned.
87
 
 
 
Even though there was no elaboration of the contents, extent, and beneficiaries of the 
right to self-determination in the UN Charter, the recognition of the right in the 
Charter and the subsequent State practice has elevated the right to a jus cogens.  State 
practice exemplified by the numerous UN General Assembly’s resolutions pertaining 
to self-determination has developed in this regard in clarifying the status of the right to 
self-determination under international law. For instance, in 1960, the UN General 
Assembly  adopted  Resolution  1514
88   
calling  on  administrative  powers  to  take 
 
immediate steps towards transferring without reservations all powers to the trust and 
non-self-governing territories or all other territories which had not yet attained 
independence in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire.
89  
This 
declaration  represented  the  political  will  behind  the  decolonisation  policy  of  the 
United Nations,
90 
and the overwhelming support the declaration received showed that 
colonialism was no longer tolerable at the time. Other resolutions like General 
Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV) defining the three options for self-determination;
91
 
and General Assembly Resolution 1654 (XVI) establishing the Special Committee on 
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Decolonisation,
92  
were historical as well given the role they played in shaping world 
opinion and attitude towards self-determination and decolonisation. 
 
The lack of mechanism of implementation of the right to self-determination in the UN 
Charter was cured by the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, 1966
93 
which has been ratified and domesticated by majority of 
Member States of the United Nations. Article 1 (1) of the Covenant stipulates that 
“[a]ll peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development.”94 The Covenant further stipulates that 
 
The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having 
responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust 
Territories, shall promote the realisation of the right of self- 
determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the 
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.
95
 
 
The exact same provisions contained in the ICCPR on self-determination were 
replicated in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
1966
96
. By providing for self-determination in the two international covenants
97
, self- 
 
determination was elevated to the status of a human right and no longer a mere 
principle. The justiciability of the right to self-determination as contained in both the 
ICESCR and the ICCPR remains in doubt as an individual complainant may not 
successfully sustain a complaint against a State party to the Covenants in respect of 
breaches  of  the  right  to  self-determination.  The  Human  Rights  Committee
98   
had 
 
emphasized in its General Comment 12
99 
on article 1 of the ICCPR that the realisation 
of the right to self-determination is of particular importance because it is an essential 
condition for the effective guarantee and observance of individual human rights.
100
 
However, the HRC had decided in its First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR that article 
 
1 of the ICCPR which provided, amongst other things, the right to self-determination, 
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is non-justiciable when alleging the breach of collective rights as against individual 
rights. This thus makes it impossible for complainants to successfully rely on the 
provisions of self-determination under the ICCPR against a State before the HRC.
101
 
This reiterates the position that the right to self-determination is a collective as against 
individual rights, and can only be claimed by peoples, not individuals. As the HRC 
had the right to decide only cases bothering on individual rights as against collective 
rights under article 1, self-determination which is a collective right falls outside the 
scope of its adjudicatory powers.
102  
In Kitok v. Sweden
103
, a Swedish citizen of Sami 
ethnic group, in his Communication, alleged violations of his rights under article 1 
and 27 of the ICCPR by the Swedish Government. The Sami ethnic group have the 
civil right to reindeer breeding as well as the rights to land and water in the villages 
they occupy. The Complainant had been denied the exercise of these rights because he 
was alleged to have lost his membership in the Sami village pursuant to a 1971 
Swedish statute
104 
that prohibits non-members from exercising Sami rights to land and 
 
water. Under the law, if a Sami engages in any other profession for a period of 3 
years, he loses his status as a Sami and his name is removed from the rolls of the Sami 
village, which he cannot re-enter unless by special permission.
105  
After exhausting 
local  remedies,  he  complained  to  the  HRC  claiming  that  the  Swedish  Crown 
arbitrarily denies the immemorial rights of the Sami minority and that the complainant 
is the victim of such denial of rights. In relation to article 1 of the ICCPR concerning 
group rights which the complainant complained of, the HRC held that an individual 
had no locus standi under article 1 of the ICCPR because he could not claim to be a 
victim of a violation of the right to self-determination which could only be claimed by 
“peoples”.106 
 
The Optional Protocol to the ICESCR in its article 1 provided for the competence of 
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
107 
to receive and consider 
communications pertaining to the rights contained in the ICESCR against State parties 
which are also parties to the Optional Protocol.
108 
The Optional Protocol entered into 
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force on the 5
th 
of May, 2013 following the ratification by Uruguay making it the 10
th 
State to ratify the Optional Protocol as provided for in article 18.
109  
This makes the 
rights provided for in the ICESCR justiciable against State parties who are also parties 
to the Optional Protocol. The Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, on the other hand, 
permits the justiciability of group rights as contained in article 1 of the ICESCR, 
unlike the first Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. Article 2 of the Optional Protocol to 
the ICESCR provides that communications may be submitted by or on behalf of 
individuals or groups of individuals.
110  
Groups of individuals, as provided for in 
article 2 of the Optional Protocol creates a pathway for the competence of the 
Committee to receive communications pertaining to group rights, like the right to self- 
determination as provided for under article 1 of the ICESCR. This is an improvement 
from the ICCPR’s First Optional Protocol which explicitly limited communications to 
individual complaints thereby excluding communications alleging breach of group 
rights. For the right to self-determination to succeed before the Committee on the 
ICESCR however, it must be shown that the breach of the right to self-determination 
affected  some  other  economic,  social,  and  cultural  rights  provided  for  under  the 
ICESCR.
111 
This means that at the international scene, the right to self-determination 
 
is justiciable under the ICESCR to the degree that it is connected to some specific 
rights protected by the ICESCR against State parties that have ratified the Optional 
Protocol to the ICESCR.
112 
Given the same scenario under the ICCPR, it is 
inadmissible as only breach of individual rights is admissible in complaints before the 
Human Rights Committee of the ICCPR.
113 
Although the new elevated status self- 
determination enjoys under the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR is an improvement 
compared to what obtains under the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, it still falls 
short of being used as an effective tool by separatists hoping to secede from a parent 
State. This is because, the right cannot stand on its own without being attached to 
some other specific rights protected by the ICESCR. Again, the Committee lacks 
coercive measures to force a State to abide by its views or recommendations on a 
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communication, especially decisions relating to the right to self-determination. 
Moreover, whatever view or recommendation the Committee may give in relation to 
the right to self-determination will be in furtherance of the realisation of other specific 
economic, social and cultural rights, and may not have civil or political connotations 
which are directly under the purview of the ICCPR. 
 
 
3.2   Extent of the Right to Self-determination 
 
 
 
During the early years of the United Nations, the right to self-determination was 
majorly associated with the rights of colonised peoples and territories not governing 
themselves to obtain independence from their erstwhile colonial masters and become 
self-governing. This explains the State practice developed in this regard through the 
different resolutions passed by the UN General Assembly on decolonisation. At 
present, the number of territories still under colonisation or non-self-governing has 
shrunk
114
, and as a result implementation of the right to self-determination by the UN 
 
has become redundant. Right to self-determination, however, goes beyond granting 
independence to colonial and non-self-governing territories. It includes the rights of 
all peoples to freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development.
115 
The two international covenants’ right to self- 
determination provisions did not in any way limit the definition or application of that 
right to only situations that had to do with decolonisation or non-self-governing 
territories. It proclaimed thus “all peoples […]”116 meaning that even peoples who 
cannot be categorised as under colonialism or non-self-governing can also take 
advantage of, and exercise the right to self-determination. If the draftsman of the two 
international covenants had wanted to limit the meaning of the right to self- 
determination, the provisions ought to have read instead, “all colonised and non-self- 
governing peoples”. But by proclaiming “all peoples […]”117 without qualification, it 
presupposes  to  conclude  that  the  right  to  self-determination  is  also  applicable  to 
peoples other than colonised or non-self-governing peoples. 
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Right to self-determination can be internal or external. Internal self-determination 
refers to the right of peoples to freely choose their own political, economic, and social 
system
118 
without any foreign interference.
119 
According to Salvatore Senese, the right 
to internal self-determination means that “other states should not, through appeals or 
pressure, seek to prevent a people from freely selecting its own political, economic, 
and social system”.120 Internal self-determination is available to a people who have 
already achieved statehood or belong to another State. For instance, the holdings of 
elections, division of a State into tiers or the granting of some degrees of autonomy to 
a region are all instances of internal self-determination. External self-determination, 
on the other hand, refers to the right of a people to constitute itself as a nation-state or 
to integrate into, or federate with an existing State.
121  
It is the aspect of the self- 
determination right that concerns the international status of a people,
122  
and to some 
 
extent, may involve foreign interference. This is the aspect of self-determination right 
that seeks to break away or tamper with the territorial integrity of an already existing 
State.  The  newest  Member-State  of  the  UN,  South  Sudan  exercised  its  right  to 
external self-determination and seceded from the Republic of Sudan in 2011.
123
 
 
 
3.3   Right to Remedial Self-determination and Territorial Integrity 
 
 
 
Generally, there seems to be no internationally guaranteed right to external self- 
determination beyond decolonisation and non-self-governing territories. This is due, 
in part, to the already established State practice which abhors assaults on the territorial 
integrity of States. President Wilson, during the Paris Peace Conference, called for a 
peaceful post-war Europe to be established through specific covenants that would 
afford mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and 
small States alike.
124 
Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter provides that 
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All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat 
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence 
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of 
the United Nations.
125
 
 
The   exercise   of   the   right   to   self-determination   which   would   lead   to   the 
dismemberment of a Member State of the UN no doubt constitutes an assault on the 
territorial  integrity of  that  State.  Consistent  State  practice  developed  in  this  area 
abhors this, even though the ICJ had declared that unilateral declaration of 
independence constitutes no breach of international law.
126 
What this means is that 
secession  is  neither  prohibited  nor  expressly  allowed  under  international  law. 
Secession cannot be claimed as a right, but the fact of a successfully seceded or 
disintegrated State cannot be denied recognition of that fact under international law as 
well. However, a right exists for remedial secession which can be asserted against a 
State that fails in its duties against a section of that State, and which can be used to 
justify any assault on the territorial integrity of that State.
127 
The idea of remedial 
secession was first broached as a possibility by the Committee of Jurists appointed in 
the Aaland Islands question
128
, and has since come to represent a base view on 
secession issues. The Committee’s opinion was to the effect that if there were to be a 
manifest and continued abuse of a State’s sovereignty against a minority population, 
that such a scenario will be enough to sidestep the principle of territorial integrity of 
States and bring the domestic scenario within the competence of an international 
body.
129  
The secession of South Sudan from Sudan evolved into remedial secession 
following continued abuses of Sudan’s sovereignty over its minority South Sudanese 
population and following a protracted civil war over independence between the two 
sides.   The   international   community   intervened   and   pressured   the   Sudanese 
government into allowing a UN supervised self-determination referendum vote by 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
125 
Art. 2 (4) Charter of the United Nations 
126  
I.C.J., Advisory Opinion on the Accordance with International Law of Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo, (July 22, 2010). 141, p. 
29-48 
127 
Art. 6 Universal Declaration of the Rights of People, Algiers, 1976 contains a suggestion that every 
people has the right to break away from any racist regime. 
128 
Report of the International Committee of Jurists, p. 5 
129  
League of Nations at the time, which has been succeeded by the United Nations. Report of the 
International Committee of Jurists, p. 5; The Aaland Islands Question, p. 28 
27 
 
citizens of South Sudan which ensured its secession, as a last resort, from the Republic 
of Sudan.
130
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4: Secession and the Modern State 
 
 
 
4.1   Human Rights Concerns and Territorial Integrity 
 
 
 
In the desperate quest to maintain and preserve territorial integrity of States, principal 
actors seem to overlook or relegate respect for human rights to the background. There 
are particular concern to issues that qualify as genocides, war crimes, and crimes 
against humanity which are perpetrated by actors on either side of a conflict when 
fighting for independence or preserving the territorial integrity of a State. The war and 
armed conflict in Nigeria and Cameroon sheds some light into grave human rights 
abuses that have occurred in the recent past wherein countries fought to preserve the 
territorial integrity of their States at the expense of grave human rights abuses. In 
Nigeria, it was reported that the Nigerian soldiers, upon capture of an Igbo town called 
Asaba, demanded a roll call of all male population in the town both the old and young. 
As the men and little boys of the town gathered in the town square at the behest of the 
Nigerian army, the commander of the Nigerian brigade Division II which captured the 
town, Murtala Mohammed, ordered his troops to summarily execute them. The troops 
opened fire killing the unarmed men and boys gathered in the town square and buried 
them in a mass grave.
131  
The London Observer of 21
st  
January 1968 noted that “the 
 
greatest single massacre occurred in the Ibo town of Asaba where 700 Ibo males were 
lined up and shot.”132 Monsignor Georges Rocheau, an emissary of the then Pope, His 
Holiness Pope Paul VI to both Biafra and Nigeria, after a fact-finding mission in both 
Nigeria and Biafra stated thus in an interview to French Le Monde Newspaper and as 
reported in several books including Forsyth and Achebe, that 
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There has been genocide, for example on the occasion of the 1966 
massacres….Two areas have suffered badly (from the fighting). Firstly 
the region between the towns of Benin and Asaba where only widows 
and orphans remain, Federal troops having for unknown reasons 
massacred all the men.
133
 
 
The Nigerian soldiers committed genocide against the Igbos by assembling, and 
summarily executing unarmed civilian men and boys in their hundreds in towns they 
captured from the then Biafran State.
134  
During his visit to Asaba on 8
th  
December, 
2002, General Yakubu Gowon, who was the then Military Head of State of Nigeria 
during the Nigeria- Biafra war apologised for the mass killing at Asaba during the war 
by his soldiers. He stated that 
 
It came to me as a shock when I came to know about the unfortunate 
happenings that happened to the sons and daughters […] of (Asaba) 
domain. I felt very touched and honestly I referred to (the killings) and 
ask for forgiveness being the one who was in charge at that time. 
Certainly, it is not something that I would have approved of in 
whatsoever. I was made ignorant of it, I think until it appeared in the 
papers. A young man wrote a book at that time.
135
 
 
Testifying  at  the  Nigerian  Truth  Commission,
136   
Major  General  Ibrahim  Haruna, 
under   cross   examination   from   Chief   Mogbo,   S.A.N
137    
representing   Ohaneze 
Ndigbo
138 
at the Oputa Panel, stated defiantly that 
 
 
As the commanding officer and leader of the troops that massacred 500 
men  in  Asaba,  I  have  no  apology  for  those  massacred  in  Asaba, 
Owerri, and Ameke-Item. I acted as a soldier maintaining the peace 
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and unity of Nigeria [...]. If General Yakubu Gowon apologised, he did 
it in his own capacity. As for me I have no apology.
139
 
 
Article 6 (a) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court defines genocide 
to mean “[…] any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or 
in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of 
the group […]”140. Rounding up defenceless male population of a town composed of 
one ethnic group and massacring them constituted the offence of genocide as set out in 
the above statute.
141 
The mental element of “intent” was present as the perpetrators 
sought to destroy, in whole or in part, ethnic Igbo population residing in the affected 
towns. Article 7 (1) (a) of the same Rome Statute defines “crimes against humanity” 
to mean “[…] any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the 
attack: (a) Murder; […]”.142 The massacres were unprovoked and were committed 
against civilian populations with full knowledge of the atrociousness of their actions, 
going from town to town
143 
in a widespread or systemic manner rounding up and 
massacring defenceless civilians in a bid to preserve the territorial integrity of Nigeria. 
 
 
The Commanding Officer of the troops that committed genocide against the Igbos 
during the war, in his own words, admitted to the crimes and was unapologetic for his 
actions and that of his troops. He justified their actions on the premise of preserving 
the territorial integrity of Nigeria. Although the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court cannot apply retroactively in Nigeria to events that happened during 
the Nigeria-Biafra war, murder was and is still a crime in Nigeria.
144 
A principal actor 
of the massacre during the war admitted on live television and before the Oputa Panel 
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of giving orders and participating in the mass murder of unarmed civilians during the 
war. It is doubtful that the perpetrators will be prosecuted for murders committed 
during  the  war.  The  Oputa  Panel  had  limited  mandate  without  prosecuting  or 
punishing  powers.  It  was  established  to  merely  investigate  and  make 
recommendations to the then government of President Olusegun Obasanjo. The 
Nigerian Government is yet to implement the recommendations of the Oputa Panel 
since the Panel submitted its report in 2002. 
 
In the Republic of Cameroon, the people of Southern Cameroon are agitating and 
engaging in guerrilla-style warfare against the Republic of Cameroon claiming a right 
to self-determination. They are advocating for the creation of an independent 
Ambazonia State from the present Southern English-speaking part of Cameroon.
145 
It 
should be noted that the people of Southern Cameroon, had in the past, exercised 
some form of right to self-determination in a referendum conducted in 1961. In the 
said 1961 referendum, they had to choose whether to remain with and become a part 
of Nigeria or to federate with their kinsmen in the newly independent Cameroon 
Republic.  Prior  to  the  referendum,  Southern  Cameroon  constituted  part  of  the 
Northern and Southern Protectorates of Nigeria which gained independence from 
Britain in 1960. The Southern Anglophone Cameroon voted to reunite with their 
brothers in the Republic of Cameroon by forming a federated Cameroon while the 
Northern Anglophone Cameroon chose to federate with Nigeria.
146 
The reunification, 
then, “was perceived as the greatest achievement and the apotheosis of African 
nationalist  struggles  par  excellence”.147   However,  due  to  certain  political 
developments  in  the  Cameroon  which  saw  to  the  abolishment  of  Cameroon’s 
Federalist Constitution and concentration of more powers in the central government, 
Southern Cameroonians came to despise the reunification, and called for a return to 
federation or a total independence from the Republic of Cameroon.
148  
In asserting 
their right to self-determination, the Southern Cameroonians argue that having 
exercised the right in the past to divorce from Nigeria and federate with the Republic 
of Cameroon, they have the inherent right to once more choose whether they want to 
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remain with the Republic of Cameroon or secede and form an independent country.
149
 
 
The Republic of Cameroon’s leadership perceived the latest agitations in the southern 
part of Cameroon as an attempt to dismember the country in breach of its territorial 
integrity, and militarily cracked down on the secessionists. The government charged 
the secessionist Southern Cameroon nationalist leaders with treason.
150 
The agitations 
started off as a civil disobedience by the residents of Anglophone Cameroon who 
embarked on industrial actions protesting the sending of French Magistrates to preside 
over courts in Anglophone Cameroon. The government sent its soldiers to quell the 
civil unrest, and the situation degenerated into armed conflict and outright demand for 
an independent State of Ambazonia encompassing the current Anglophone areas of 
Cameroon. Leaders of the Ambazonia separatist movements who had gathered in a 
hotel in Abuja, Nigeria, were rounded up by the Nigerian Secret Police and extradited 
to Cameroon where they were charged and convicted of treason by a military court.
151
 
 
The trial itself was reported to have been conducted in a grave manner without 
affording the defendants their basic rights as protected under the Cameroonian 
Constitution. For instance, the defendants were all civilians but were tried in a military 
court. Again, the trial was conducted in French language without affording the 
Anglophone defendants an interpreter to interpret the charges, evidence and court 
proceedings in the language they understand.
152
 
 
 
Apart from the above criminal trials, there had been widespread reports of extra- 
judicial killings and executions of alleged separatists, separatist fighters and their 
family members by the Cameroonian military. One report paints a graphic scenario of 
an extra-judicial killing of a perceived separatist by the Cameroonian military that was 
videotaped on 24
th 
March 2019 thus 
 
 
There is a hole dug in dry mud ground, like a grave, with a blindfolded 
man inside who is clearly alive and does not appear to be injured. As 
the man in the grave tries to get up, a man in military uniform kicks 
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him down. There are at least four other men in military uniforms in 
view at different moments, and at least one of the men in military 
uniform has gun. There appears to be another man among the military 
men, wearing shorts and a t-shirt, without shoes on his feet – it is not 
clear if he is with the men in uniform or a prisoner. The French speaker 
recording appears to say 'Ça va comme ça'. There is the sound of a gun 
rifle click. The man blindfolded in the grave tries to get up. A man 
behind the camera shouts, 'ce la va, ce la va'. The man behind the 
camera speaks more French which I struggle to understand. He says, 'le 
téte'. There is the sound of 5 gunshots. The man in the grave is no 
longer moving.
153
 
 
Assuming the victim was a separatist, and was armed or engaging in warfare against 
the State before he was finally captured by the Cameroonian military as seen in the 
video, does the law allow summary execution of a prisoner of war without trial? 
Article 8 (2) (c) (i) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998 
makes it a war crime to murder a prisoner of war. If there is a contention as to whether 
there is an armed conflict in Cameroon which is not of an international character to 
warrant the toga of war crime, the extra judicial killing of the victim above is still 
murder or capital murder under local laws.
154 
There is premeditation in the actions of 
 
the soldiers; they dug a hole, threw the victim into the hole, brought out a recording 
device and recorded the killing. That is capital murder going by local laws, and a war 
crime should the perpetrators appear before the International Criminal Court.
155  
The 
above case is just one of numerous instances of human rights abuses highlighted in the 
report
156 
mostly committed by government forces in their attempt to quell the uprising 
and demand for self-determination in Anglophone Cameroon. The report
157 
contained 
gory details of numerous State sponsored executions as well as killings by separatists 
that for want of decency will not be highlighted here. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
153  
Willis, R., McAuley, J., Ndeunyema, N., and Angove, J., “Human Rights Abuses in the Cameroon 
Anglophone Crises: A Submission of Evidence to UK Parliament”, (A report submitted by an 
independent research team based at the Faculty of Law, University of Oxford on 30 October, 2019). 
154 
Sections 275 and 276 of the Penal Code of the Republic of Cameroon, Law No. 2016/007 of 12 July 
2016 
155 
Although Cameroon signed the Rome Statute of International Criminal Court on 17
th 
July, 1998, it is 
yet to ratify it, thereby making the Rome Statute inapplicable to Cameroon. See Coalition for the 
International Criminal Court, http://iccnow.org/?mod=urc0706, accessed on 20.12.2019 at 1050 
156 
Willis, R., et. Al., supra 
157 
Willis, R., et. Al., supra 
33 
 
4.2 Criminalising Agitations for the Exercise of the Right to Self- 
determination 
 
 
Agitations or demands for the opportunity to exercise the right to self-determination 
have been criminalised in some countries even though right to self-determination is 
enshrined in the Charter setting up the United Nations.
158  
In Cameroon, for instance, 
demand for secession was quickly criminalised in the wake of the civil disobedience 
and unrest that engulfed the Anglophone parts of Cameroon in the recent past. In the 
new Penal Code of 2016, section 111 criminalises secession and posits that “whoever 
undertakes in any manner to infringe the territorial integrity of the republic shall be 
punished with imprisonment for life.”159 The section went ahead in subsection 2 to 
provide for death penalty for any person found guilty of the offence as provided in 
section 111 if such offence was committed during the time of war, state of emergency, 
or a period of siege. What this means is that agitating, demanding or campaigning for 
secession from the Republic of Cameroon, or the opportunity to exercise the right to 
self-determination, just as Anglophone Cameroonians did in 1961, would be deemed a 
contravention of section 111 of the new Penal Code, and therefore, upon conviction 
subject to life imprisonment or death as the case may be. It was on the basis of this 
penal provision that the Anglophone separatist leaders, who were arrested in Nigeria 
and repatriated to Cameroon by the Nigerian Government, were tried by a military 
tribunal and sentenced to life imprisonment in August 2019 for being in breach of the 
offence as stated in section 111 of the 2016 Penal Code.
160
 
 
In Nigeria, agitations for the independence of a sovereign State of Biafra still rages 
even though the then Eastern Nigeria that made up the defunct Biafra was defeated in 
war and re-annexed back into Nigeria subsequently thereafter. Over the past two 
decades, some prominent Igbo persons have risen up to campaign and demand for the 
independence of the Igbos from the Nigerian federation to form the Republic of 
Biafra. Officially, the preamble to the Nigerian Constitution states that “We the people 
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria Having firmly and solemnly resolve (sic), to live in 
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unity and harmony as one indivisible and indissoluble sovereign nation
161  
under 
God […]”162 It should be pointed out here that the Constitution itself was a product of 
the military regime that handed over power to a civilian government in 1999.
163  
The 
people were neither consulted nor their opinions sought before the Constitution was 
imposed on the country, and so it is a fallacy to state that the people resolved to live as 
one indivisible and indissoluble sovereign nation. That notwithstanding, the 1999 
Constitution is the grundnorm in Nigeria, and supersedes every other legislation in the 
country.
164 
Going by the constitutional preamble and provisions, secession is 
unconstitutional, and any agitation for the exercise of the right to self-determination 
which may have the end result of any part of the country seceding to form an 
independent sovereign State is also unconstitutional.
165 
The Nigerian Criminal and 
Penal Codes did not provide for any offence related to the disintegration or secession 
of a part of the country to form an independent sovereign State. The Nigerian 
government, however, has found usefulness in treason offences under the Codes by 
charging separatists or persons agitating for Nigeria’s disintegration of committing 
treason and treasonable felonies. Treason is the offence of acting to overthrow one’s 
government or to harm or kill its sovereign.
166 
Depending on the context in which the 
proponents may want to apply the offence of treason to, it may also include a violation 
of allegiance to one’s Sovereign or to one’s State.167 The Nigerian Criminal Code 
stipulates thus 
 
(1) Any person who levies war against the State, in order to intimidate 
or  overawe  the  President  or  the  Governor  of  a  State,  is  guilty  of 
treason, and is liable to the punishment of death. 
(2) Any person conspiring with any person, either within or without 
Nigeria, to levy war against the State with intent to cause such levying 
 
 
161 
Emphasis mine 
162 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as Amended in 2010, hereinafter referred to 
as “the CFRN 1999, as amended in 2010”. Also, see sec. 2 (1) the CFRN 1999, as amended in 2010. 
163  
Following the death of the then Head of State, General Abacha in 1998, General Abdulsalami 
Abubakar took over as the new Head of State, set up a military Constitution Drafting Committee which 
made a new Constitution for Nigeria that came into effect in 1999 and upon which a civilian 
government took over power from the military in the same year. See Ogowewo, T. I.,  “Why the 
Judicial Annulment of the Constitution of 1999 is Imperative for the Survival of Nigeria’s Democracy ”, 
in Journal of African Law vol. 44, no. 2, 2000, pp. 135-166 
164   
The  Constitution is  supreme and  takes  precedence should  any  other  law  made  or  which  is 
applicable to Nigeria be found to be inconsistent with it. See sec. 1 (2) the CFRN 1999, as amended in 
2010 
165 
Sec. 2 (1) the CFRN 1999, as amended in 2010. 
166 
Mayben, M., Manifest Secession: A Proposal for Peace and Liberty (1776 Patriot’s Press, 2010), p. 
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Mayben, M., supra 
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of war as would be treason if committed by a citizen of Nigeria, is 
guilty of treason and is liable to the punishment of death; 
Provided that nothing in this section shall prevent any act from being 
treason which is so by the law of England as is in force in Nigeria.
168
 
 
The purport of the above provision is that the carrying out of the acts stipulated above 
as well as conspiring to do same amounts to treason. The punishment for the offence 
of treason in Nigeria is death. Although harsh, the intent of the draftsman was to 
totally discourage the commission or conspiring to commit the offence of treason 
against the Nigerian State or its Sovereign, as the State’s major aim lies in deterring 
the commission of an offence rather than in punishing offenders. The proviso to the 
above section no longer serves any meaningful purpose as no one in Nigeria today can 
be charged with, for instance, committing adultery with the Sovereign’s consort which 
is high treason in the United Kingdom
169 
but not an offence in Nigeria. The Nigerian 
 
Constitution stipulates that no person shall be convicted of a criminal offence unless 
that  offence  is  defined  and  its  penalty  thereof  is  prescribed  in  a  written  law.
170
 
Nowhere was it written in the Nigerian laws that committing adultery, or doing same 
with a Sovereign’s consort is treason, so the offence of treason in the United Kingdom 
cannot validly be imported into the Nigerian law of treason without offending the 
above constitutional provision. 
The section providing for treason in Nigeria is exclusive; it enumerated actions that 
are treasonous and did not give any room for inference. For the offence of treason to 
be committed in Nigeria, a traitor must have levied war or conspired with any other 
person to levy war against the Nigerian State in order to intimidate or overawe the 
President or Governor of a state. In terms of agitations for the exercise of the right to 
self-determination or secession, the treason section does not include them as acts 
which  are  treasonous.  However,  such  acts  could  become  treasonous  when  they 
involve levying of war or conspiring to levy war in order to intimidate or overawe the 
Nigerian President into granting their wishes of holding a self-determination 
referendum or seceding from Nigeria. This means that individuals can lawfully agitate 
for the right to self-determination in so far as they do not wage war or conspire to 
wage  such  war  against  the  Nigerian  State  in  order  to  intimidate  or overawe  the 
President. Waging war or conspiracy to wage war are principal elements that must be 
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170 
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proved in order for a treason charge to succeed. According to Okonkwo and Naish
171
, 
“war” as is used in the above section does not bear the restricted meaning which it 
bears under international law, as it is not necessary that the accused persons should be 
members of an armed force or even trained in military warfare or in the use of arms.
172
 
The type of weapon used in levying the war is immaterial, so also the number of 
persons involved in levying the war.
173  
The war must be levied for a general and 
public purpose, if it is done merely for a private purpose, then the offence may be 
simply a riot.
174  
For instance, In R. v Boro,
175  
the defendant’s counsel argued that to 
establish the offence of treason as provided under the above section following the 
waging of war or conspiracy to do same, it must be proved that the Head of State was 
personally intimidated or overawed as provided in section 37 of the Criminal Code. 
The Supreme Court however held that there is no difference between intimidating and 
overawing the State and doing the same to the Head of State as the Head of State is 
the embodiment of the State, and that to intimidate him is the same as intimidating the 
State.
176
 
The Nigerian government arrested one Ralph Uwazuruike in 2005 and charged him 
and several others with conspiracy and treason against the Nigerian President and 
State.
177 
Ralph Uwazuruike was the founder and leader of Movement for the 
Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) which he formed in Lagos, 
Nigeria on 13
th 
September 1999 as a secessionist group to advance the interests of the 
Igbo people of Nigeria and to demand for the independence of the old Eastern Region 
of Nigeria to form a sovereign Biafran State. At the time Uwazuruike was arrested and 
charged for treason, MASSOB calls for and engages in civil disobedience across 
Nigeria, asking Igbo indigenes to observe sit-at-home protests, and holding protests 
that paralyse economic activities in the respective cities in which they were held. He 
spent several months in prison whilst awaiting trial, before a Court of Appeal admitted 
him to bail in 2008. He was subsequently arrested in 2010, and again charged with 
treason in a Magistrate Court which clearly lacks jurisdiction to entertain such matters 
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so as to keep the accused person in prison pending trial.
178 
As it is the case in Holding 
Charge matters, an accused will enter a plea to the charge
179 
while the Magistrate 
remands him or her in prison pending trial by a higher court. Typically, accused 
persons in Nigeria who had been moved to prison on a holding charge spend several 
years in prison whilst awaiting trial by a competent court.
180 
Without prejudicing the 
outcome of the criminal matters, it will be difficult to convict the defendants  of 
treason without proving that they actually levied war or conspired to levy war against 
the Nigerian State or its President, and that in fact, the President or the State was 
actually intimidated or overawed by such levying of war or conspiracy to so do.
181
 
A splinter group
182  
later emerged to rival MASSOB and was led by one Nnamdi 
 
Kanu,
183   
a  Nigerian-British  citizen.  Nnamdi  Kanu,  the  leader  of  IPOB,  too  was 
arrested upon entering Nigeria in 2015, and charged with committing treason against 
the Nigerian State for calling for the secession of the Old Eastern Nigeria to form 
Biafra. He was held in prison for several months despite several court orders granting 
him bail pending trial. President Buhari
184  
even admitted in a televised interview on 
30
th  
December, 2015 that he was not going to release Nnamdi Kanu, the leader of 
 
IPOB, even though the courts had severally ordered for his release on bail pending 
trial.
185 
The admission by the Nigerian President in a televised interview of wanting to 
keep holding the leader of the secessionist IPOB in detention against court orders 
confirms the suspicion in many quarters that indiscriminate arrest and purported 
prosecution of secessionist agitators in Nigeria were more of political rather than 
genuine belief in the allegations that such persons really committed treason and should 
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be held accountable in accordance with the law of the land. Nnamdi Kanu was 
eventually released from prison on 27
th 
April, 2017, 18 months after he was arrested 
and held in prison awaiting trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5: Secession and the Courts 
 
 
 
5.1   The ICJ and Secession 
 
 
 
Since the formation of the International Court of Justice, it has had few opportunities 
to pronounce on cases that border on secession and self-determination beyond non 
self-governing peoples and people still under colonial rule.
186 
The Kosovo scenario 
which was before the ICJ for determination presented the court with the best 
opportunity to finally settle the issue of self-determination in the modern period’s 
international law which does not relate to colonised people or people who have not 
attained self-governance. Kosovo was previously a part of Serbia which was in 
federation with Montenegro to form the parent State of Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia.
187 
Following long running ethnic tensions and sectarian war between the 
people of Kosovo on the one hand, and the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
188
 
 
and the attendant interventions by different international players supporting either side 
to the conflict, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1244 (1999) to ensure 
interim administration of Kosovo, the return of refugees, withdrawal of military forces 
from  the  region,  and  the  resolution  of  the  future  political  status  of  Kosovo.
189
 
Resolution 1244 (1999) was pursuant to the UN’s Security Council’s powers under 
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chapter VII of the UN Charter. Following the disintegration of the Republic of 
Yugoslavia in 2006, Kosovo should have fallen within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
Serbian State save for the interim administration created by the UN’s Security Council 
to administer Kosovo. The interim administration was called “the United Nations 
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo”,190 and part of its mandate was to oversee, 
 
in a final stage, the transfer of authority from Kosovo’s provisional institutions to 
institutions established under a political settlement.
191 
When negotiations on the future 
status of Kosovo failed
192
, legislative assembly elections were held in Kosovo on 17
th 
November, 2007, which in turn sat, and adopted an independence declaration for the 
Republic of Kosovo on 17
th 
February, 2008.
193 
The independence declaration in its 
paragraph 1, as quoted in the advisory opinion of the ICJ, stated that 
 
 
We, the democratically-elected leaders of our people, hereby declare 
Kosovo to be an independent and sovereign state. This declaration 
reflects the will of our people and it is in full accordance with the 
recommendations of UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari and his 
Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement.
194
 
 
The  Republic  of  Serbia  contests  this  unilateral  declaration  of  independence  by 
Kosovo,  and  sought  a  ruling  on  the  compliance  with  international  law  of  such 
unilateral declaration from the International Court of Justice.
195 
Serbia contended that 
there is an implied prohibition of unilateral declaration of independence under the 
principle of territorial integrity as provided for under article 2 (4) of the UN Charter. 
The  said  article  provides  that  “All  Members  shall  refrain  in  their  international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
 
 
190 
Otherwise referred to as the UNMIK 
191 
I.C.J., Advisory Opinion on Kosovo, p. 29 
192 
The then UN Secretary General appointed former Finnish President, Martti Ahtisaari, as his special 
envoy on Kosovo to oversee negotiations between the two sides. The negotiations f ailed, and Mr. 
Ahtisaari included in his recommendations that the only viable option to settle the future status of 
Kosovo is independence for Kosovo. A troika representing the European Union, United States, and the 
Russian Federation was also set up for further negotiations. The Troika’s negotiation between the 
opposing sides also failed before the unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo. See I.C.J., 
Advisory Opinion on Kosovo, par. 72, p. 34 
193 
I.C.J., Advisory Opinion on Kosovo, par. 65-74, pp. 31-35 
194 
I.C.J., Advisory Opinion on Kosovo, par. 75, pp. 35 
195  
The ICJ’s ruling followed a question posed by the General Assembly pursuant to resolution G.A. 
Res. 63/3 of October 8, 2008, made following Serbia’s request. The question for the ICJ was framed 
thus:  “Is  the  unilateral;  declaration  of  independence  by  the  provisional  institutions  of  Self- 
Government of Kosovo in accordance with international law?” 
40 
 
independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of 
the United Nations.”196  The ICJ, in its advisory opinion of 22nd  July 2010, held that 
there was no prohibition of declarations of independence according to State practice, 
and that state practice, on the contrary, points clearly to the conclusion that 
international law contained no prohibition to declaration of independence.
197 
This 
means that rather than prohibiting independence declarations, State practice clearly 
show that such declarations are not prohibited as over time numerous states have 
emerged through independence declarations. According to the court, the contention 
that prohibition of unilateral declarations of independence is implicit in the principle 
of territorial integrity is doubtful as the principle of territorial integrity is confined to 
the sphere of relations between States.
198 
It concluded that 
 
The adoption of the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 
did not violate general international law, Security Council resolution 
1244 (1999) or the Constitutional Framework. Consequently, the 
adoption of that declaration did not violate any applicable rule of 
international law.
199
 
 
A  cursory  look  at  article  2  (4)  of  the  UN  Charter  shows  that  the  article  was 
specifically referring to relations between Member States of the UN as the court 
rightly pointed out. Kosovo, at the time it unilaterally declared its independence, was 
neither a State per say nor a Member State of the UN, and so could not be covered by 
article 2 (4) of the UN Charter to warrant the application of the said article in the case 
before the ICJ in respect of assaulting the territorial integrity of the Serbian State. 
Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter referred to “all members […] in their international 
relations  […]”200   while  the  dispute  in  question  was  an  internal  national  dispute 
 
between Serbia and its component part, the people of Kosovo. Serbia even contended 
in its filings before the ICJ that Kosovo was a component part of Serbia thereby 
nullifying any argument internationalising the dispute, which when stretched further, 
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prohibits assaulting the territorial integrity of a Member State by another Member 
 
State.
201
 
 
 
On the question whether the Security Council’s resolution 1244 (1999) prohibited 
declaration of independence from the Republic of Serbia as was done by the Kosovo’s 
General Assembly on 17
th 
February 2008, the ICJ opined that the said resolution 1244 
(1999) contains no express or implied prohibition of same.
202 
According to the court, 
 
the established practice of the Security Council in making resolutions show that the 
Security Council usually specify express conditions in situations where it decides to 
establish restrictive conditions for the permanent status of a territory.
203 
In the case of 
Northern Cyprus, for instance, the Security Council had in resolution 1251 (1999) 
reaffirmed  its  earlier  position  concerning  the  conflict  in  Cyprus,  and  stated  that 
“Cyprus settlement must be based on a State of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and 
international personality and a single citizenship, with its independence and territorial 
integrity safeguarded.”204 The stipulations in the resolution concerning the Cypriot 
conflict were unambiguous as it made clear the intentions of the Security Council. It 
specifically foreclosed any validation of acts assaulting or attempting to assault the 
territorial integrity of the Cypriot State. In the case of Kosovo, however, the Security 
Council Resolution 1244 (1999) alluded to the final status of Kosovo but did not 
reserve for itself the final determination on how that final status will be resolved. The 
said Resolution also failed or avoided enumerating any conditions for arriving at the 
said final status of Kosovo. The court concluded that the Resolution 1244 (1999) does 
not preclude the issuance of the declaration of independence, and so the declaration of 
independence of 17
th 
February 2008 did not contravene Resolution 1244 (1999).
205 
At 
the time the independence declaration was made, Republic of Yugoslavia’s and by 
extension the succeeding Republic of Serbia’s sovereignty over Kosovo was still 
temporarily suspended by Resolution 1244 (1999). What this meant was that at the 
material time of the unilateral independence declaration, the effective legal order 
applicable in Kosovo derives from the Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), and 
not the Serbian legal jurisdiction. Since the court held that resolution 1244 (1999) 
does not preclude explicitly or implicitly, independence declaration by the people of 
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Kosovo, the said independence declaration, prima facie, was valid as it did not 
contravene the said Resolution 1244 (1999) which served as a temporary de jure 
grundnorm
206 
from which other laws in Kosovo derived their validity. 
 
The ICJ noted that unilateral declarations of independence are not per se, illegal under 
international law. Illegality, however, may attach to such declarations when there is a 
breach of certain norms of international law, which rises to the level of jus cogens, in 
the surrounding circumstances existing at the time of the unilateral declaration. 
According to the court, 
 
[…] the illegality attached to the declarations of independence thus 
stemmed not from the unilateral character of these declarations as such, 
but from the fact that they were, or would have been, connected with 
the unlawful use of force or other egregious violations of norms of 
general international law, in particular those of a peremptory character 
(jus cogens).
207
 
 
This reiterates the neutrality of international law towards unilateral declarations of 
independence in so far as basic norms of international law, which have jus cogens 
character, are not breached during the process or in connection with the said unilateral 
declarations. For instance the invasion or use of force against a State by another State 
for the purposes of effecting a secession of a component part of that other State will 
render illegal under international law whatever independence declaration arising as a 
result of that invasion. This is because, article 2 (4) of the UN Charter enjoins all 
Member States, in their international relations, to refrain from the use of force or 
threats  thereof  against  the  territorial  integrity  of  any  State.
208    
The  unilateral 
 
declaration of independence by the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus from the 
Republic of Cyprus following an invasion of Cyprus by the Republic of Turkey was 
declared invalid by the UN Security Council which reiterated the recognition of one 
Cyprus with sovereignty over the whole island nation.
209 
The Republic of Turkey, till 
date, remains the only Member State of the UN to recognise the independence of the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. In the case of Crimea, which allegedly voted on 
a referendum pursuant to a Russian invasion of the Crimean region of the Republic of 
 
 
206 
Grundnorm is a pure theory of law, propounded by Hans Kelson, which is taken to mean the basic 
norm upon which every other norm derives its validity in the society. See Harris, J. W., “When and 
Why Does the Grundnorm Change?”, in The Cambridge Law Journal vol. 29, No. 1, 1971, pp. 103-133 
207 
I.C.J., Advisory Opinion on Kosovo, par. 81, pp. 38 
208 
Article 2 (4) UN Charter 
209 
Security Council Resolution 1251 (1999), par. 11 
43 
 
Ukraine, unilaterally declared independence from the Republic of Ukraine, and was 
annexed by the Russian Federation, the UN Security Council failed to agree on a 
resolution concerning the issue given the veto power of the Russian Federation in the 
Security Council. The invasion of Ukraine by Russia in order to effect the annexation 
of  Crimea  was  a  breach  of  article  2  (4)  of  the  UN  Charter,  which  said  breach 
amounted to a violation of a jus cogens. Russia vetoed the Security Council’s attempt 
to censure its misdeeds relating to Crimea. Nevertheless, the UN General Assembly 
through Resolution GA/11493 of 27 March 2014 condemned the invasion and the 
subsequent annexation of Crimea by Russia, and called upon Member States not to 
recognise changes in the status of Crimea region.
210  
The United States, European 
 
Union, as well as NATO also condemned same and imposed varying degrees of 
sanctions against Russia for the breach of the territorial integrity of Ukraine.
211 
When 
the Crimean and Northern Cyprus scenario are compared with Kosovo, breach of 
norms of international law of jus cogens character stands out as a distinguishing factor 
which led to a different outcome under international law for Kosovo unlike Crimea 
and Northern Cyprus. 
 
It is however, unfortunate that the ICJ adopted a narrow interpretation of the issues 
before it for consideration in the Kosovo case by declaring self-determination and 
remedial secession to be beyond the scope of the question posed to it by the General 
Assembly. The court deliberately avoided pronouncing on “the validity or legal effects 
of the recognition of Kosovo”212 by UN Member States. The court also failed to 
examine the justifications advanced by the States that recognised Kosovo’s 
sovereignty.
213  
Implicit in the question of compliance with international law of 
Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence lays the reasons for such unilateral 
declaration and the validity thereof. The reasons are not far-fetched; right to self- 
determination and remedial secession. Therefore, it appears absurd to look at the 
legality of such unilateral declaration of independence without taking into account the 
underlying factors that caused such unilateral declaration. 
 
 
210 
General Assembly Resolution GA/11493 of 27 March 2014 
211 
EU restrictive measures in response to the crisis in Ukraine, 
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters- 
homepage_en/8322/EU%20restrictive%20measures%20in%20response%20to%20the%20crisis%20in 
%20Ukraine, accessed on 19.02.2020 
212 
Ibid, par. 51 
213   
Bolton  G.,  &  Visoka  G.,  “Recognizing Kosovo’s  Independence: Remedial  secession  or  earned 
sovereignty?”, in South East European Studies at Oxford, Occasional Paper No. 11/10, 2010, p. 2 
44 
 
5.2   Regional Courts and Secession I (The ECtHR) 
 
 
 
In order to highlight the development of the right to self-determination beyond the 
ICJ, decisions of some regional courts, in this case the European Court of Human 
Rights
214 
and the African Commission on Human Rights,
215 
will be examined. The 
choice  of  the  two  regional  courts  stems  from  the  researcher’s  background  as  an 
African where there are many active secessionist struggles, and Europe which 
previously colonised several countries prior to the UN’s decolonisation drive. The 
ECtHR had in 2003 made some salient pronouncements in the case of Refah Partisi
216 
that implicitly touched on the right to self-determination. The Refah Partisi was a 
political party in the Republic of Turkey that was dissolved by the Constitutional 
Court  of Turkey,  and  its  assets  forfeited  to  the State for becoming  “a centre of 
activities against the principle of secularism” in Turkey.217  In the national courts, the 
leadership of the party, as well as members of parliament elected on its platform, were 
accused of professing and supporting objectives that included the introduction of 
sharia law as well as establishment of a theocratic regime in Turkey. The said 
objectives were contrary to the principles of democracy which the Republic of Turkey 
accepted upon acceding to the European Convention on Human Rights. Although the 
party claimed to have expelled those responsible for making the comments or 
propagating the offensive objectives after being served with the prosecutor’s 
application to dissolve the party, the Constitutional Court found the party liable and 
subsequently ordered its dissolution. The party and other applicants applied to the 
ECtHR alleging breach of their articles 9 (freedom of thought), 10 (freedom of 
expression), 11 (freedom of assembly and association), 14 (prohibition of 
discrimination),  17  (prohibition  of  abuse  of  rights),  18  (limitations  on  use  of 
restrictions  on  rights)  of  the  Convention  on  Human  Rights,
218    
and  articles  1 
 
(protection of property), and 3  (right to free elections) of Protocol No. 1 of the 
 
Convention.
219   
The  court,  in  dismissing  the  application,  opined  in  one  of  the 
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paragraphs that a political party may campaign for a change in the law, legal or 
constitutional structures of a State only on two conditions. The court stated the 
conditions to be “firstly, the means used to that end must be legal and democratic in 
every  respect;  secondly,  the  change  proposed  must  itself  be  compatible  with 
fundamental  democratic  principles.”220   Although  secession  and  self-determination 
 
were not at issue before the court, but implicit in the above conditions set out by the 
court  is  recognition  by  the  ECtHR  that  under  the  Convention,  a  people  can 
legitimately seek a change in the constitution of a country or secede from it. This the 
people can do if they adhere to the conditions listed above in their pursuit of their set 
out goals even if such goals were to be disallowed under national laws. This means 
that a region like Catalonia in Spain can legitimately pursue secession or secede from 
Spain under the Convention even though it is unlawful under national laws. This the 
Catalan secessionists can do by using democratic means without resort to any violence 
in pursuing their aims, and the proposed State which they wish to create outside Spain 
being  democratic.  In  the  instant  case  of  Refah  Partisi,  for  seeking  to  enthrone 
theocracy which is anti-democratic, and for inciting violence, the court held that the 
Refah Partisi and other applicants cannot lay claim to the Convention’s protection 
against penalties imposed on them under national laws for their anti-democratic 
objectives. 
 
The ECtHR, however in a recent case,
221 
had ruled against pro-secessionist Catalan’s 
then  President  and  members  of  Parliament  of  the  region’s  Assembly  in  their 
application to the court for relief against the suspension of the region’s parliamentary 
session by the Spanish Constitutional Court. In Forcadell I Lluis and Others v. Spain, 
the issues for determination concerned alleged breach of the freedom of peaceful 
assembly of the applicants under article 11 of the Convention and article 3 of Protocol 
No. 1 to the Convention. The facts of the show that the Catalan Parliament enacted a 
law in September 2017
222  
mandating the conduct of an independence referendum for 
Catalonia, and the declaration of independence should the people vote in favour of 
secession.
223 
The minority members of Parliament were dissatisfied and petitioned the 
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constitutional court, which issued a provisional injunction suspending the said law
224 
and law no. 20/2017
225  
pending the determination on merit of the suit. The Catalan 
Parliament ignored the constitutional court’s provisional injunction and held the 
referendum on October 1, 2017.
226 
The Parliament convened a plenary sitting for 
October 9, 2017 to declare the results of the referendum and to proclaim Catalonia’s 
independence   from   Spain.
227    
The   Plenary   sitting   for   October   9,   2017   was 
provisionally suspended by the constitutional court on the application of minority 
members of the Parliament, pending a determination on merit of the suit.
228 
The 
constitutional court subsequently declared the laws unconstitutional for being marred 
by procedural irregularities, and also held that referendum and secession issues 
infringed national unity, and therefore fell outside the jurisdiction of the Catalan 
Parliament.
229 
It was on the basis of the above facts that the applicants applied to the 
ECtHR for the alleged breach of their right to freedom of assembly as guaranteed 
under article 11 of the Convention. The ECtHR, in its judgment, declared the 
application inadmissible and held that the constitutional court was within its rights in 
provisionally suspending the plenary sitting of October 9, 2017 for stemming from an 
already suspended Law No. 19/2017. In justifying the inadmissibility of the 
application, the ECtHR posited that “the Organic Law on the Constitutional Court 
provides for the possibility of adopting any necessary preventive measures and 
provisional decisions in order to prevent an appeal from becoming nugatory.”230  The 
Catalan  Parliament  had  acted  unlawfully  by  going  ahead  with  the  planning  and 
holding of the referendum without first getting the court to lift the provisional 
suspension of law No. 19/2017. By going ahead to conduct the referendum despite the 
court’s order to the contrary, they foisted on the court a situation which will render 
nugatory whatever judgment on the merit the court will render in the main suit. The 
disobedience of a valid court order renders invalid whatever further actions the 
Parliament took in disobedience of the existing court order, for according to Lord 
Denning, “you cannot place something on nothing and expect it to stand.”231  The 
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ECtHR also reiterated its earlier stated two conditions
232  
when seeking to enthrone a 
new legal order. According to the ECtHR, 
 
Regard  should  also  be  had  to  the  irregularities  in  the  approval 
procedure for Law no. 19/2017 (which had originated the convening of 
the impugned sitting) subsequently noted by the Constitutional Court in 
its decision on the merits. Indeed, while a political party is entitled to 
campaign   for   a   change   in   the   State’s   legislation   or   legal   or 
constitutional structures, the party in question may only do so if the 
means used are absolutely lawful and democratic.
233
 
 
Manifest irregularities bedevilled Law No. 19/2017. The law was provisionally 
suspended by the constitutional court. The Catalan Parliament sought to give effect to 
the law without first getting the court to lift the provisional suspension thereby acting 
unlawfully.  The  ECtHR  admitted  that  a  democratic  process  designated  as  a 
referendum by a Contracting State may fall within the scope of article 3 of Protocol 
No. 1 to the Convention, however, that would require the procedure to be conducted 
“under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in 
the choice of the legislature”.234 When the above established facts are juxtaposed with 
 
the two conditions given by the ECtHR when seeking to establish a new order or 
secede from a State, the activities of the secessionist Catalan members of Parliament 
failed to pass the basic test of democratic and lawful means in the pursuit of their aims 
as set out by the ECtHR.
235
 
 
When the two cases of Forcadell I Lluis and Others v. Spain and Refah Partisi 
emanating from the ECtHR are contrasted with national policies of most countries 
which are signatories to the Convention, one finds that secession stricto sensu, is not 
unlawful under the Convention even though it may be unlawful under national laws. 
However, to lawfully secede under the Convention, the two conditions as listed in the 
case of Refah Partisi and reiterated in Forcadell I Lluis and Others v. Spain must be 
followed and adhered to. To this end, a region in a country that is signatory to the 
Convention can secede lawfully under the Convention, despite objections from the 
national government, if it uses democratic and lawful means devoid of any violence in 
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pursuing the aim of secession, and the proposed independent State which it seeks to 
create being a democratic State.
236
 
 
 
5.3   Regional Courts and Secession II (The ACHR) 
 
 
 
In Africa, the African States, having benefited from self-determination rights against 
their colonialists, were in no hurry to include the right to self-determination in the 
African regional legal system.
237 
It was not until the drafting of the African Charter on 
Human  and  People’s  Rights238   that  the  right  to  self-determination  emerged  as  a 
 
concept  and  a  right  in  the  regional  legal  system  beyond  the  colonial  context.
239
 
 
According to the Charter, 
 
1. All peoples shall have the right to existence. They shall have the 
unquestionable and inalienable right to self-determination. They shall 
freely determine their political status and shall pursue their economic 
and  social  development  according  to  the  policy  they  have  freely 
chosen. 
2.  Colonized  or  oppressed  peoples  shall  have  the  right  to  free 
themselves from the bonds of domination by resorting to any means 
recognized by the international community 
3. All peoples shall have the right to the assistance of the State Parties 
to the present Charter in their liberation struggle against foreign 
domination, be it political, economic or cultural.
240
 
Coming at a time when most African countries had gained independence from their 
 
erstwhile colonial masters, the self-determination rights provision under the Charter 
was given validation beyond the colonial context by the Charter. Self-determination 
right was divided into two by the Charter by alluding to the right to self-determination 
of all peoples, and the right to self-determination of peoples still under colonial or 
imperial rule.
241  
The Charter made copious use of the term “people” and projected 
self-determination rights as a people’s rights without providing any definition of the 
term  “people”.  The  African  Commission  on  Human  and  People’s  Rights242   in 
 
 
 
 
 
 
236 
See Refah Partisi case ; Forcadell I Lluis and Others v. Spain (dec.), supra 
237 
Salomon, S., “Self-determination in the case law of the African Commission: Lessons for Europe”, in 
VRÜ Verfassung und Recht in Übersee, (VRÜ, Jahrgang 50 (2017), Heft 3), p. 224 
238  
The African Charter was adopted on 27 June 1981 in Nairobi, Kenya, and came into force on 21 
October 1986 after the ratification of same by 25 member States 
239 
Salomon, S., 2017, supra, p. 224 
240 
Article 20 African Charter on Human and People’s Rights 
241 
Salomon, S., 2017, supra, p. 230 
242 
Hereinafter referred to as “the African Commission” 
49 
 
Endorois’ Communication243 enumerated certain features which “a people” should 
possess in order to be regarded as such under the African Charter with benefits of the 
people’s or group rights as contained in the Charter. According to the Commission in 
the Endorois’ case, a people should have 
…a common historical tradition, racial or ethnic identity, cultural 
homogeneity, linguistic unity, religious and ideological affinities, 
territorial connection, and a common economic life or other bonds, 
identities and affinities they collectively enjoy – especially rights 
enumerated under Articles 19 to 24 of the African Charter – or suffer 
collectively from the deprivation of such rights.
244
 
In  Kevin  Mwaganga  Gunme  et  al  v.  Cameroon,
245   
the  complainants  brought  the 
 
Communication against the Republic of Cameroon, which is a State party to the 
African Charter, alleging violations of the right to self-determination of the people of 
Southern Cameroon. The alleged violations were consequent upon the two-option 
referendum of 1961 which asked whether the people of Southern Cameroon would 
federate with either Nigeria or the Republic of Cameroon. Majority of the voters in the 
said referendum chose to federate with the new Republic of Cameroon.The 
complainants, however, contend that the referendum vote was never ratified by the 
then Southern Cameroon’s House of Assembly, and that the lack of third option of 
independence in the referendum question negatively impacted the right to self- 
determination of the people of Southern Cameroon. In their complaint, they contend 
that the people of southern Cameroon qualify as a people, and therefore are capable of 
enjoying the group rights under the African Charter, and in particular, the right to self- 
determination. The complainants also alleged civil, political, and economic 
marginalisation of the people of Southern Cameroon by the respondent Republic of 
Cameroon.
246 
The African Commission in its decision, however, declined jurisdiction 
 
to entertain the issue of “illegal and forced annexation, or colonial occupation of 
Southern Cameroon by the Respondent State” since the said issue fell outside the 
Commission’s jurisdiction rationae temporis given the fact that the facts complained 
therein occurred before the coming into force of the African Charter in 1986 and were 
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not alleged to be a continuing violation.
247 
In the determination of other alleged issues, 
the Commission found that the people of Southern Cameroon qualify as a “people” 
under the Charter because they exhibit several characteristics associated with a 
“people”, including a shared history; tradition; language; territory; and political 
outlook.
248  
It is for the people to identify themselves as such, as identity is an innate 
characteristic within a people, which external people could recognise but not to deny 
its existence.
249  
Having determined the Southern Cameroonians constituted a people 
to whom the people’s rights under the Charter are applicable to, including the right to 
self-determination, the Commission surprisingly held that it cannot envisage, condone 
or encourage secession as a form of self-determination for the people of Southern 
Cameroons  as  that  will  jeopardise  the  territorial  integrity  of  the  Republic  of 
Cameroon, which the Commission is obliged to uphold as a party to the Charter.
250
 
According  to  the  Commission,  “The  Commission  has  however  accepted  that 
autonomy within a sovereign State, in the context of self government, confederacy, or 
federation, while preserving territorial integrity of a State party, can be exercised 
under the Charter.”251  There is however, no provision under the Charter defining the 
forms of self-determination a people could exercise, neither does the provisions on 
self-determination limit the exercise of such right to internal self-determination only, 
to the exclusion of outright secession. The Commission is of the view that for article 
20 of the Charter to be deemed to have been violated, that “it must satisfy the 
Commission that the two conditions under Article 20(2), namely oppression and 
domination have been met.”252  Article 20 of the Charter, which provides for right to 
self-determination, does not contain any indication to the effect that article 20 (1) and 
(2) must be read conjunctively and the condition of being oppressed or dominated 
fulfilled before a people can take advantage of either article 20 (1) or 20 (2) in 
asserting a right to self-determination. The subsections (1) and (2) of article 20 of the 
Charter ended with full stop marks at the end of each subsection thereby signifying 
they were disjunctive and can stand separately when alleging or finding a breach to 
warrant   the   exercise   of   self-determination   rights   as   contained   therein.   The 
Commission failed to give any indication as to how it arrived at the conjunctive 
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reading of subsections (1) and (2) of article 20 of the African Charter. It is bewildering 
therefore where the Commission found the conjunctive meaning it is ascribing to the 
subsections. 
In an earlier case of Katangese Peoples’ Congress v. Zaire253, the Commission had 
 
held that in order for alleged violations under the Charter to constitute the basis for the 
exercise of the right to self-determination, the violations must be of such a nature as to 
show “concrete evidence of violations of human rights to the point that the territorial 
integrity of the State Party should be called to question, coupled with the denial of the 
people, their right to participate in the government as guaranteed by Article 13 (1).”254 
 
In that case, the complainant alleged a violation of the right to self-determination of 
the Katangese people as provided for under article 20 (1) of the African Charter on 
Human and People’s Rights by the Republic of Zaire. The complainant, who was the 
President  of  the  Katangese  Peoples’  Congress,  however  failed  to  disclose  any 
instances of the alleged breach of the rights contained in the Charter to warrant the 
exercise or application of the self-determination rights of the Katangese people to 
secession.
255  
The Commission cited the Katanga case in deciding Gunme’s case on 
 
the severity of breaches of the articles of the Charter a State party may be found liable 
in order to warrant the invocation of external self-determination in favour of the 
applicants against the State party. The facts of the Katanga case can be distinguished 
from Gunme’s case given that serious breaches were alleged by the complainants in 
Gunme’s case and the Commission found the respondent Republic of Cameroon liable 
of having breached those rights as contained in articles 2, 4, 5, 6, 6, and 11 of the 
African Charter. The Commission also determined that the Southern Cameroonians 
constituted a people capable of taking advantage of the people’s rights as contained in 
articles 19-24 of the Charter. It is however, difficult to fathom why the Commission 
introduced extraneous requirements for the exercise of the right to self-determination 
under article 20 outside the clear provisions of the said article. 
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5.4   National Courts and Secession (Quebec Case) 
 
 
 
Decisions   from   national  courts   have  little   influence  on   the  development   of 
international law, but one particular decision stands out which cannot be ignored when 
discussing right to self-determination and secession. In Reference re Secession of 
Quebec
256
, a reference was made to the Canadian Supreme Court by the Governor-in- 
Council concerning certain questions relating to the secession of Quebec from 
Canada.
257  
The questions referred to the court were 3-fold thus; the constitutionality 
under Canada’s Constitution, of a unilateral secession of Quebec from Canada; the 
legality of such unilateral secession of Quebec from Canada under international law; 
and in the event of a conflict between domestic and international law on a unilateral 
secession of Quebec from Canada, which aspect of law would take precedence in 
Canada.
258 
On the question whether there is a right to unilateral session under the 
Canadian Constitution, the court held that since the Constitution vouchsafes order and 
stability, that secession of a province under the Constitution could not be unilaterally 
achieved, and without principled negotiation with other participants in confederation 
within the existing constitutional framework.
259 
According to the court, “a clear 
majority vote in Quebec on a clear question in favour of secession would confer 
democratic legitimacy on the secession initiative which all of the other participants in 
Confederation would have to recognize.”260 The court is of the opinion that despite the 
outcome of a referendum vote, the seceding part cannot purport to invoke a right to 
self-determination in order to dictate the terms of a proposed secession to the other 
federating units as the vote itself cannot push aside the principles of federalism, rule 
of law, individual and minority rights, or other principles of democracy in Canada.
261
 
This does not mean however, that the Canadian constitutional order will be indifferent 
to a clear expression of majority of Quebecers voting in favour of secession to show 
that they no longer wished to remain a part of Canada.
262 
In negotiations after a 
successful referendum, the court held that the other parts of the federating units and 
the Canadian federal government will have no basis to deny the right of the people 
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and government of Quebec to pursue secession should a clear majority of the Quebec 
people vote in favour of same so long as the rights of others are respected in the 
process.
263 
The court, in answering questions concerning the legality of unilateral 
secession of Quebec under international opined that it was not purporting to act as an 
international tribunal sitting in judgment over international laws, but merely giving 
advisory opinion to the Governor-in-Council on legal issues concerning the future of 
the Canadian federation from which Quebec seeks to secede.
264 
The court declined to 
provide a definition of who “a people” is, who are capable of enjoying the right to 
self-determination.
265 
However, it admitted there is a right to self-determination under 
international law, but that the said right was limited to people that are still governed as 
part of a colonial empire; a people subject to alien subjugation, domination or 
exploitation; or where a people is denied any meaningful exercise of its right to self- 
determination  within  the  State  they  are  part  of.
266   
As  Quebec  do  not  meet  the 
threshold of a colonial or oppressed people, or a people who have been denied 
meaningful access to government to pursue their political, economic, cultural and 
social development, the court held that the people and government of Quebec “do not 
enjoy a right at international law to effect the secession of Quebec from Canada 
unilaterally.”267  Having concluded there is no right to unilateral secession under the 
Constitution and under international law, the court failed to rule out the possibility of 
unilateral secession by Quebec leading to a de facto session. It held that the success of 
such unilateral secession would depend on the international community according or 
withholding recognition of same.
268 
Where the international community recognises 
such de facto secession, the act of recognising same, according to the court, will not 
accord any retroactive justification for the act of secession under the Canadian 
Constitution or under international law.
269 
In deciding the last issue referred to the 
court, the court held that there was no conflict between the Canadian national law and 
international law on the issue of right to self-determination and secession, and so there 
was no need to address the issue in the context of the referred questions.
270
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The Quebec Advisory Opinion of the Canadian Supreme Court was given in 1998. In 
the light of the 2010 Advisory Opinion of the ICJ on the accordance of the unilateral 
declaration of independence by Kosovo to the effect that unilateral declaration of 
independence is not unlawful under international law, the 1998 Canadian Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Reference re Secession of Quebec271 no longer seems to be good law 
in  Canada’s  jurisprudence.  The  Canadian  Supreme  Court  held  that  unilateral 
declaration of independence is unlawful under international while the ICJ reached the 
exact opposite decision in its Advisory Opinion on Kosovo.
272 
The Canadian Supreme 
Court shied away from making a pronouncement on the third referred issue of conflict 
between international law and Canadian domestic law and which of the two laws takes 
precedence in situations where there is a conflict.
273 
As the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on 
Kosovo has shown, unilateral declaration of independence is not prohibited under 
international law, and this is in direct conflict with the latter’s prohibition under the 
Canadian Constitution. How the Canadian Supreme Court will resolve this conflict of 
laws remains to be seen when next an opportunity presents itself for a decision on the 
third  referred  issue.  Again,  when  the  second  issue  of  the  referred  questions  is 
compared with article 20 of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, the 
African Charter went beyond colonised and oppressed people to make a broad 
provision for all peoples to enjoy the right to self-determination as guaranteed under 
the Charter. When however, same is viewed in the light of the African Commission’s 
decision  in  Gunme’s  case,  this  will  lead  to  the  same  conclusion  with  Canada’s 
Supreme Court that a people need to be under colonial or alien subjugation in order to 
enjoy the right of self-determination under international law. However, as Canada is 
neither a Member State nor a signatory to the African Charter on Human and People’s 
Rights, the African Charter is not applicable to it, and whatever comparison there is to 
make on the issue of the extent of the right to self-determination, is merely academic. 
 
Following  the  Supreme  Court’s  ruling  in  Reference  re  Secession  of  Quebec,  the 
Canadian Parliament enacted in 2000 the Clarity Act
274 
which sets out the modalities 
to be followed and the clarity of questions to be asked in a referendum when a 
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province tables before the province’s Legislative Assembly a proposal for referendum 
on whether or not to secede from Canada. The enactment of the Clarity Act by the 
Canadian Parliament elicited a critical response from the Quebec region which in turn 
enacted its own Bill 99
275 
in 2000 reaffirming the fundamental principle that the 
Quebec people is free to take charge of its own destiny, determine its political status 
and pursue its economic, social and cultural development, as well as possessing the 
inalienable right to self-determination.
276 
Bill 99 reiterated the fact that it is for the 
Quebec people, acting through their own political institutions that will determine the 
modalities for any future referendum vote and not as stated in the federal Clarity 
Act.
277  
When there is a referendum in Quebec, Bill 99 maintains that the winning 
option is the option that obtains a majority of the valid votes cast
278  
unlike the clear 
 
majority rule stipulated in the Reference re Secession of Quebec case and reiterated by 
the Clarity Act.
279  
Bill 99 essentially affirms Quebec’s unilateral right to determine 
the modalities for future referendum questions and votes in opposition to the Supreme 
Court’s ruling and the Clarity Act. A challenge to the constitutional validity of Bill 99 
in a Quebec superior court led the court to hold, 17 years after the suit was instituted, 
that Bill 99 was not unconstitutional.
280 
The applicant alleged that the adoption of Bill 
99 was tantamount to the Quebec government giving itself the unilateral right to 
secede without negotiating with the rest of Canada as stated by the Supreme Court in 
Reference re Secession of Quebec case.
281 
The applicant also sought a declaration that 
Bill 99 was ultra vires the powers of the Quebec National Assembly as the law had 
effects beyond Quebec and will affect the whole of Canada in the event of Quebec’s 
secession from Canada.
282  
The court rejected all the applicant’s pleadings and held 
that Bill 99 was valid constitutionally as the Quebec National Assembly had the 
constitutional jurisdiction to adopt it, and that Bill 99 does not infringe on any 
provisions of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
283  
The judgment of the 
superior court in this case is currently on appeal to an appellate court, and until the 
appeal is disposed off, the judgment remains valid and binding. However, the tug of 
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war between the Canadian Federal Parliament and the National Assembly of Quebec 
over who calls the shots on referendum issues leading to secession is a potential 
political crisis if not properly handled. 
 
The codification of referendum requirements by the Federal Parliament of Canada in 
the Clarity Act represents a tremendous step in giving life to the right to self- 
determination beyond colonised or oppressed people by a national government. The 
Clarity Act represents an acknowledgment by a State that it cannot hold a people 
against their consent and force them to perpetually remain in a political union which is 
contrary to the principle of self-determination of peoples. It recognises that it is for the 
people  to  decide  for  themselves,  through  their  mandate,  how  they  ought  to  be 
governed and whom to pay allegiance to. Internationalisation of the principles 
contained in the Canadian Clarity Act will eliminate, or drastically reduce incidences 
of armed conflict usually associated with struggles for self-determination. This could 
be achieved through an optional protocol to the ICCPR which will be applicable in the 
countries that ratified the optional protocol. However, getting countries to ratify such 
an optional protocol will be a herculean task as most countries are made up of multi- 
ethnic societies who may want to take advantage of the clarity in self-determination 
issue and attain statehood. 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6: Scotland as a Contemporary Precedent 
 
 
 
6.1   From Biafra to Scotland 
 
 
 
The United Kingdom as a permanent member of the UN’s Security Council, a 
multinational  State  with  an  active  secessionist  movement,  and  a  former  colonial 
master, is a good source of contemporary model from which other countries’ handling 
of secessionist and self-determination issues could be adjudged. It presupposes 
therefore, that the way and manner the British Government handles agitations for 
secession within its own union will have a reverberating effect all over the world, 
especially in countries that reverence the United Kingdom as their former colonialist 
and from whom they derived much of their laws. 
57 
 
In the UK, the 2011 Scottish Parliamentary election handed a major boost to pro- 
independence  campaigners  as  the  Scottish  Nationalist  Party,  which  was  at  the 
forefront of Scottish independence push, won majority seats in the Parliament.
284 
This 
paved the way for negotiations with the UK government on the future of Scotland. 
While the UK government agreed that the future of Scotland lies in the hands of 
Scottish voters, it contested the competency of the Scottish Parliament to solely 
legislate on Scottish referendum.
285 
Both sides reached an agreement after several 
negotiations and signed the Edinburgh Agreement on 15
th 
October, 2012 thereby 
allowing the Scottish Parliament to legislate on Scottish referendum that will bear 
only a single question of Scottish independence or continued union with the United 
Kingdom.
286  
According to the agreement, “the referendum should have a clear legal 
base; be legislated for by the Scottish Parliament; be conducted so as to command the 
confidence of parliaments, government and people; and deliver a fair test and decisive 
expression of the views of people of Scotland and a result that everyone will 
respect.”287 The Edinburgh Agreement represents a major milestone in recognition of 
the right to self-determination of a people by a country during peace time without the 
threats of war or breakdown of law and order.
288 
A Scottish Independence Bill of 2014 
framed the justification and the inherent right to self-determination succinctly thus 
 
Self-determination  developed  during  the  20
th 
century  and  has  been 
codified in the fundamental and universal  documents of the 
international system, such as the Charter of the United Nations in 1945 
and the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966. The referendum, and 
becoming an independent country, would be an act of self- 
determination by the people of Scotland. However self-determination is 
permanent and that principle would continue to be respected following 
independence by the on-going democratic nature of Government in 
Scotland.
289
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The Agreement enabled the Scottish Parliament to legislate on referendum, which said 
referendum was carried out on 18
th 
September, 2014.
290 
However, the result was 
emphatic, as majority of the voters chose to remain part of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Irelands rather than gaining independence and forming the 
Republic of Scotland.
291  
55.3% of the voters voted “NO” on independence while 
44.7% voted “YES”. The 2014 referendum made it the third time Scotland had voted 
on  a  self-determination  referendum  in  relation  to  their  continued  union  with  the 
UK.
292 
 
Although the Scottish referendum failed in its bid to lead to a new and independent 
Scotland,
293 
nevertheless, separatists in Nigeria, Anglophone Cameroon, other parts of 
sub-Saharan Africa agitating for independence, and even the Catalonians of Spain 
point to that as a civilised way of settling self-determination issues.
294 
In the midst of 
disagreements, rising tensions, conflicts and threats of conflicts, that opposing parties 
could still reach a political solution on issues of session without resort to conflict and 
allow a people to determine for themselves their political future post decolonisation, 
was inconceivable until the Edinburgh Agreement.
295 
How to achieve this amicable 
political solution, however without the drumbeats of war, remains an uphill task in 
most countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, where every political calculation is 
perceived from the prism of ethnicity, religion, and where might still makes right.
296
 
 
In Nigeria, both the leaders of MASSOB and IPOB in Biafra’s independence agitation 
 
had at different times called for referendums to be conducted in the formerly Eastern 
 
 
 
290 
, D. & Calvet, M. S. I. (ed), supra, p. 187 
291 
D. & Calvet, M. S. I. (eds), supra, p. 187 
292  
Antunes, S. F., “The Scottish Referendum 2014: the Political Process before and after the ‘NO’ 
Vote”, in E-journal of International Relations vol. 6 no. 2, 2015, p. 45 
293 
The 2014 referendum was won by voters who wished to remain a part of the UK union rather than 
gaining independence and standing on its own as a sovereign nation 
294 
Duclos, N., supra, par. 11 
295 
The UK government and that of Scotland came to the agreement on the understanding and basis of 
the “doctrine of the mandate”, which implies that obtaining a  majority in an election by a party gives 
the party in power the political and moral authority to carry out any policy which formed part of its 
manifestoes and electioneering campaigns. The Scottish National Party, haven campaigned and won 
absolute majority in the 2011 parliamentary election on the strength of Scottish nationalism is entitled 
to implement the promises contained in the party’s manifesto and upon which it won the election, 
albeit, a right to referendum.   See Bochel J., Denver, D., & Macartney, A., (eds.), The Referendum 
Experience. Scotland 1979, (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1981), p. 171. Also reported in 
Duclos, N., supra, par. 13 
296 
Wenar, L., Blake, M., James, A., Kutz, C., Mehdiyeva, N., and Stilz, A., Beyond Oil: Philosophy, Policy, 
and the Future (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), p. 14 
59 
 
Region of Nigeria.
297 
The referendum demand, if granted, will allow the people decide 
for themselves what their political future will be and whether they still wanted to be 
part of Nigeria or secede and become an independent nation. Going by the classical 
precedent set by the Edinburgh Agreement, the calls for referendum by the different 
separatist groups, however, lack one vital element: legitimacy.
298 
Legitimacy is a 
conception by a polity that a government is properly constituted, and therefore, is 
worthy of obedience. The separatist leaders and groups were neither elected nor 
appointed to speak or act on behalf of the Igbo people, or the peoples that constituted 
the formerly old Eastern Region of Nigeria. Whereas in the case of Scotland, it was 
obvious that the Scottish Parliament, dominated by majorities from pro-independence 
parties had the mandate of the people to negotiate the parameters of referendum and 
self-determination rights with the UK government based in London.
299  
The Scottish 
Parliament was elected by the people while the MASSOB and IPOB groups and their 
leaderships lack the people’s mandate as they were neither elected nor accountable to 
the people. This creates a difficulty in opening a proper legal channel for discussions 
and negotiations with the government at the centre from which Biafra intends to 
secede. The separatist groups are unknown to the law; at best they amount to pressure 
groups, and may not successfully pursue negotiations with the government without 
being hounded by law enforcement agents and prosecutors as criminals. 
 
The independence push by Catalans fit into the same category with that of the Scots 
on the issue of mandate, as pro-independence parties held majority seats in the Catalan 
Parliament. However, both agitations had different outcomes; the Scottish push was 
deemed legal while that of the Catalans were declared illegal by the Spanish 
constitutional court, thereby leaving open the question whether legitimacy alone or 
authority from the people to pursue self-determination on their behalf, was enough to 
arrive at the same legality test of the Scottish push. There is however, a tiny 
distinguishing factor in both mandates; the independence-seeking parties in Scotland 
won a super majority in Parliament while those in Catalonia won a simple majority. A 
decisive electoral victory in the form of a super majority in Parliament or a two third 
yes-vote in a referendum is a clear indication of the wishes of the electorates on an 
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issue that has a huge political impact like secession. This re-echoes the thorny dispute 
between the federal government of Canada and the Quebec Region on the modalities 
for a future referendum vote on secession which gave birth to two parallel federal and 
regional statutes that run counter to each other.
300  
While the Clarity Act stipulates a 
two-third majority vote in favour of secession for any part wishing to secede from the 
Canadian federation, Bill 99 reiterates that any decision on secession of Quebec will 
be made by the people of Quebec through their representatives in government and the 
regional institutions, and that any future referendum vote on secession will succeed by 
a simple majority vote.  The outcome of a legal challenge to  Bill 99 is awaited, 
although a court of first instance had already ruled that the Bill 99 in itself was not 
ultra vires the powers of the Quebec regional Parliament.
301  
In the Catalan case, the 
degree of legitimacy obtained by the independence-seeking parties in Catalonia as 
represented by the constitution of the Catalan Parliament at the time of the 
independence push, was a significant derailing factor in the self-determination project. 
The majority in Catalan Parliament was accused of sidestepping procedural safeguards 
by the minorities, in their bid to enact Law No. 19/2017 to enable the region conduct 
the self-determination referendum.
302  
On the application of the minority members of 
the Catalan Parliament, the said law was provisionally suspended. Had the 
independence-seeking parties won a super majority in the Catalan Parliament, the 
minority members may have been unable to successfully question their legitimacy or 
the legitimacy of Law No. 19/2017 that will have legally enabled the holding of a 
referendum and potentially cured other maladies that afflicted the entire process. 
 
 
Should the Nigerian separatists metamorphose into elected politicians, it remains to be 
seen whether in actual fact, separatist leaders-turned political leaders will be spared 
criminal  prosecutions  by  State  actors  for  actively  pursuing  the  disintegration  of 
Nigeria. The events leading up to Catalonia’s 2014 referendum which was declared 
illegal by the Spanish constitutional court is instructive in this wise when contrasted 
with the Scottish referendum push that bore remarkably close resemblance. Prior to 
the  run-up  of  the  2014  independence  referendum  in  Catalonia,  the  Spanish 
government in Madrid strongly opposed the competence of the Catalan Parliament to 
legislate or hold such referendum. There was a contention whether Catalonia is a 
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nation, just like the Scots, 
303 
capable of exercising the right to self-determination. A 
“nation”, which is synonymous with “a people” as was used in the self-determination 
provisions
304
, means a group of people having a common origin, language, and 
tradition, and usually constituting a political unit.
305 
The nationhood of Scotland was 
never in doubt as they constituted a people with a common origin, language, and a 
distinct culture.
306 
In the case of Catalonia, the Catalan Government asserted that 
Catalonia is a nation in the Government’s independence white paper.307  The Catalan 
Parliament had in 2012 adopted a Resolution asserting the Catalan “people’s right to 
decide” their political future.308 The Catalan Government’s white paper acknowledged 
that the Spanish Constitution does not recognise the different constituents as “nations” 
but rather “national communities”, and reserved the exclusive use of the term “nation” 
for the Spanish State.
309 
That notwithstanding, the Catalans saw this as a contentious 
issue between it and the Spanish Government, and maintained that Catalonia has 
always felt like a nation.
310  
The preamble to the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia 
which was ratified through a referendum in 2006 asserts that “In reflection of the 
feelings and the wishes of the citizens of Catalonia, the Parliament of Catalonia has 
defined Catalonia as a nation by an ample majority”.311  The Spanish Constitutional 
Court, in 2010, ruled unconstitutional assertions that Catalonia is a nation.
312  
The 
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unconstitutionality of Acts, Resolutions, or Laws affirming Catalonia’s credentials as 
a nation paved the way for the voiding of subsequent acts or activities that sought to 
affirm Catalonia’s right to self-determine as a nation. Since the court held that 
Catalonia is not a nation, it undercuts the 2014 referendum arguments proffered by the 
pro-independence  parties,  and  justified  the  criminalisation  of  subsequent  actions 
carried out in pursuance of the referendum and independence push by the said parties. 
When political solution to the impasse failed, the Catalan Parliament enacted a law 
allowing  a  non-binding  consultation  to  take  place.
313   
The  Spanish  Government 
 
appealed to the Constitutional Court and the law, as well as the decree allowing 
referendum, was struck down by the court through an injunction.
314 
When the Catalan 
Government proceeded with the referendum despite the Constitutional Court’s order 
suspending and prohibiting same, the Spanish Government instituted criminal actions 
against the Catalan President in his personal capacity for “disobedience and 
dishonesty”.315 
 
The Catalan’s right to self-determination bid was fraught with challenges ranging 
from the lack of absolute majority in the Parliament to indicate a clear mandate to 
pursue self-determination, to the non-recognition of Catalonia as a nation under the 
Spanish Constitution. The non-recognition of the nationhood of Catalonia under the 
Spanish Constitution as a factor that worked against the independence push is 
debatable. This is because, it is for the people to identify themselves as a nation, as 
identity  is  an  innate  characteristic  within  a  people,  which  external  people  could 
recognise but not to deny its existence.
316  
The people of Catalonia have the right to 
 
identify themselves as a nation or a people who could exercise the group right to self- 
determination. Although the relevance of Gume’s case is limited to Africa, the ECtHR 
may not arrive at a different conclusion were it to have the opportunity to determine 
the nationhood of the Catalans or any other national communities in Spain. 
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In the case of Biafra, there is no pro-independence political party in the Nigeria’s 
political system. This makes it difficult obtaining the necessary mandate to pursue 
secessionist policies. On whether the people of old Eastern Region of Nigeria, or the 
Igbos clamouring for secession constitute a “nation” or “a people” within Nigeria, 
several scholars, journalists, politicians, and opinion leaders have regarded Nigeria as 
a  country  of  many  nations.
317   
The  Hausa/  Fulani,  Yoruba,  and  the  Igbo  people 
constitute the 3 biggest tribes
318  
in Nigeria. It was reported that Professor Sagay,
319
 
 
opined that “prior to the British conquest of the different nations making up the 
present day Nigeria, these nations were independent nation states- and communities 
independent of each other and of Britain.”320 It is not in doubt that the Igbo people of 
South Eastern Nigeria
321 
posses all the attributes of a nation ranging from defined 
population, territory, distinct language, and culture, just like every other tribes or 
people  that  make  up  Nigeria.  However,  the  Nigerian  Constitution,  just  like  the 
Spanish  Constitution  as  seen  above,  recognises  only  one  nation;  the  Nigerian 
Nation.
322 
The preamble to the Constitution provides that “[…] Having firmly and 
solemnly resolve(sic) to live in unity and harmony as one indivisible and indissoluble 
sovereign nation under God….”323  This implies that the only recognised nation in 
Nigeria is the Nigeria Nation.
324  
The Nigerian nation is a federation of micro-states 
 
and not a multi-national State.
325  
The Igbo people of Nigeria regard themselves as a 
nation, and they possess most of the attributes of a people as enunciated in Ngume’s 
case. The fact that the Nigerian Constitution does not regard any of the tribes as 
nations does not in itself deprive them that identity, for according to the African 
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Commission in Ngume’s Case, it is for the people to identify themselves as such, and 
not for external people to deny such identity.
326
 
 
 
The only referendum to have been conducted in Nigeria was the 1961 Southern 
Cameroon’s referendum which led to the region’s annexation by the Republic of 
Cameroon.
327 
The agitation and campaigns for the said 1961 referendum was 
spearheaded by elected representatives of the Southern Cameroon at the then old 
Eastern Nigeria’s House of Assembly situated at Enugu, Nigeria. Following a crises 
that rocked the defunct National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons
328  
in 1953 
and the subsequent removal of the only Southern Cameroonian in the Executive 
Council of the Eastern Region, southern Cameroonian representatives elected on the 
platform of the NCNC felt marginalised and saw reunification with their counterparts 
in the French Cameroons as a viable alternative to pursue.
329 
The Southern 
Cameroonian representatives called a conference of notable leaders in Southern 
Cameroon, and subsequently formed an indigenous political party in the Southern 
Cameroons called The Kamerun National Congress.
330 
The formation of the KNC 
effectively ended the alliance under the NCNC, as the new KNC won 12 out of 13 
seats in the 1953 General Assembly election.
331 
The affirmation of the Southern 
Cameroon’s  resolve   to   self-determine   as   shown  in   the   results   of   the  1953 
parliamentary elections that the then newly established indigenous KNC party won led 
the British Government to grant quasi-autonomous regional status to the Southern 
Cameroons, thereby making it distinct and separate from the old Eastern Nigeria 
Region.
332 
Further triumph of indigenous parties with secessionist and reunification 
ideologies during the 1959 general election in Nigeria led to an eventual agreement on 
a proposed referendum for the Southern Cameroons. The referendum was made 
possible due to electoral victories of indigenous political parties with secessionist and 
reunification ideologies at the polls which clearly showed they had the mandate of 
their people to pursue the stated ideologies.
333
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6.2   The Option of Remedial Secession 
 
 
 
The Federal Military Government of Nigeria led by Lt. Col. Gowon invaded the then 
Republic of Biafra on the 6
th 
of July 1967 following the latter’s declaration of 
independence and secession from the Nigerian State on the 30
th 
day of May, 1967.
334
 
The invasion marked the beginning of the Nigeria-Biafra war with the Biafran side 
fighting to preserve their newly declared independence from the Nigerian State. The 
Biafrans contended that the Nigerian Military Government, in connivance with the 
mainly Muslim northern part of Nigeria carried out genocide against the Igbo race 
following the pogroms that took place in the northern part of the country in 1966. The 
pogrom left several thousands of Igbo military officers and civilians dead.
335 
The 
Biafrans also contended that in prosecuting the war against the Biafran State, the 
Nigerian  Military  Government  shelled  and  inflicted  heavy  casualties  on  civilian 
targets,  engaged  in  summary  executions  of  unarmed  civilians,  and  employed 
starvation as a weapon of war by blockading all access routes into Biafra.
336
 
 
There is a general belief that a people can assert a claim to remedial secession if there 
were to be a manifest and continued abuse of a State’s sovereignty against a minority 
population.
337 
Such a scenario, according to the Committee of Jurists, would be proper 
to bring an international dispute arising from the domestic scenario within the 
competence  of  the  then  League  of  Nations.
338   
Precedent  for  remedial  secession 
beyond the colonial context already exists in Africa in the case of South Sudan. The 
people of South Sudan, then an integral part of the Republic of Sudan, were allowed 
to hold a referendum to determine their political future given the established abuse of 
Sudan’s sovereignty over the minority South Sudanese people, which resulted in a 
long  drawn  out  armed  conflict  between  the  Sudanese  State  and  rebels  in  South 
Sudan.
339 
The people of South Sudan overwhelmingly voted for independence, which 
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they attained in 2011.
340 
In the Biafran context, the Igbo people of Nigeria have 
continually asserted that they are being marginalised since their defeat and re- 
annexation after the Nigeria-Biafra war in 1970. Following the surrender of the 
Biafrans, and to mark the end of the civil war, Col. Gowon,
341 
declared that there was 
“no victor, no vanquished” in the war.342 He also declared the Federal Military 
Government’s 3Rs policies of “Reconciliation, Reconstruction, and Restitution”.343 
However, the policies Gowon’s government pursued afterwards were in stark 
difference to his avowed reconciliation, reconstruction, and restitution policies. The 
first  indication  of  the  government’s  ill  will  towards  the  Igbo  people  was  the 
declaration by the then Nigeria’s Finance Minister, Obafemi Awolowo, that all Igbos, 
irrespective of their pre-war financial assets deposited in the banks, were entitled to 
only an equivalent of £20 at the time the war ended to rebuild their lives. The rest of 
the monies belonging to every Igbo man that were trapped in the banks, after the £20 
withdrawals were confiscated by the Nigerian State. Again, the Federal Military 
Government confiscated and disposed off properties owned by the Igbos in different 
parts of the country outside the Igbo enclave, which the Igbos abandoned to return to 
Igboland for their own safety during the war. To legitimise the brazen theft of private 
properties of the Igbos after the war, the Federal Military Government in 1979 
retroactively enacted The Abandoned Properties Act of 1979 to provide cover for the 
thefts. The Igbos were effectively disenfranchised of the things they owned prior to 
the war. These few instances clearly show that there was a victor and the vanquished 
in the war, and the victorious Nigeria never hid this fact from the vanquished Igbos. 
The marginalisation suffered by the Igbo people of Nigeria is a clear case of manifest 
and  continued  abuse  of  a  State’s  sovereignty  against  a  minority population.  The 
abuses are manifest and they have not been remedied more than 50 years after the war 
ended. The Igbos are entitled and could legitimately pursue remedial secession should 
they so desire, even though it is difficult imagining a clear path to success for such 
without the drumbeats of war or the acquiescence of the Nigerian State. 
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In the case of Anglophone Cameroon, the international community pays little attention 
to internal cries of marginalisation of a section of a country which usually snowballs 
into  armed  conflicts  and  outright  calls  for  secession.  For  instance,  the  English 
speaking part of Cameroon has been alleging marginalisation since 1972 when the 
Cameroonian President abolished Cameroon’s Federal Constitution and in its place 
adopted a unitary Constitution.
344 
The Anglophone Cameroonians have organised 
rallies, protests, and civil disobedience aimed towards getting the international 
community to intervene and stop the Cameroonian President and his government from 
erasing their Anglophone history and heritage, but to no avail. The situation escalated 
when in October 2016 French-speaking Magistrates and teachers were sent to go work 
and teach in English speaking regions which sparked off massive civil unrests that 
grounded both civil and economic activities in the affected regions. An attempt by the 
Cameroonian Government to use military force to quash the protests and civil 
disobedience snowballed into a full-fledged armed conflict between separatists in 
Anglophone  Cameroon  and  the  Government  of  Cameroon.  Previous  demands  of 
return  to  Federal  Constitution  were  quickly  replaced  by  outright  demands  for 
secession and the independence of Anglophone Cameroon to be called the Republic of 
Ambazonia. Foisting French Magistrates on courts in English-speaking areas and 
administration officials who spoke only French on an English-speaking bureaucracy 
are overt attempts at eradicating a people’s history, culture, and way of life. The 
Cameroonian Government tried to eviscerate the Englishness of a section of the 
country and sought to assimilate them into the French way of life, and hence the 
current impasse with the attendant toll on human rights. However, following fears of 
Western sanctions due to an increase in negative publicity the armed conflict had 
generated, the Cameroonian President in December, 2019 announced the granting of 
Special  Regional  Status  to  Anglophone  Cameroon  Regions.  It  is  left  to  be  seen 
whether the newly created special status will be able to diffuse the tension and return 
normalcy to the troubled regions, although the leadership of the separatist fighters 
rejected such special status and maintained their demands for an outright secession. 
 
Should the newly created special status for Anglophone regions in Cameroon spur a 
return  to  normalcy  in  the  troubled  regions,  it  will  represent  an  internal  self- 
determination achieved on the strength of mass civil disobedience, armed conflict, and 
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a people’s refusal to abandon their right to self-determination in the face of sheer 
forceful instrumentality of the State. It remains to be seen, however, whether the 
Anglophone Regions would be placated by the offer and a full return to normalcy 
restored. Part of the newly crafted special status for the Anglophone Cameroon is 
recognition of the distinct way of life of the people, different from the rest of the 
Cameroon, and a tacit admission of the marginalisation of Anglophone Cameroon by 
the Cameroonian Government. This begs the question whether the Anglophone 
Cameroonians are justified in seeking for remedial secession on the strength of 
perennial marginalisation since the abolishment of the Federal Constitution in 1972. 
According to the Committee of Jurists in the Aaland Island question, if there were to 
be a manifest and continued abuse of a State’s sovereignty against a minority 
population, such scenario will be proper to bring an international dispute arising from 
the domestic scenario within the competence of the League of Nations.
345 
It is evident 
 
that the Republic of Cameroon has continually abused its sovereignty against the 
minority Anglophone Cameroon and sought to eviscerate their English heritage by 
seeking to assimilate them into the French culture. The Anglophone Cameroonians 
have been protesting since 1972 for an end to the State’s abuse of its sovereignty over 
them by returning to a federal Constitution which will allay their fears of 
marginalisation in the hands of the majority. In light of the manifest and continuous 
abuse of State sovereignty over a minority population by the Republic of Cameroon, 
the minority Anglophone Cameroon is justified in seeking for secession, albeit 
remedial. 
 
 
6.3   Conclusion 
 
 
 
Through a lengthy research process, it is established that secession is not prohibited 
under international law, although there is no enforceable right to secession. There is a 
right to self-determination, which may lead to secession under international law for 
oppressed people and people who are still subject to colonialism or alien subjugation. 
This does not however, mean that secession for all other cases generally, is outlawed 
under international  law  as  international  law  is  silent  on  the issue,  and  a people, 
whether colonised or not, can successfully secede unilaterally from a parent State 
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without breaching international law.
346 
In Africa, the African Charter granted the right 
to self-determination to all peoples, including oppressed people and people who are 
still subject to colonial rule,
347 
although the African Commission adopted a restrictive 
interpretation of the right to self-determination of peoples as enunciated in the African 
Charter to include only internal self-determination for non-colonised people,
348 
whilst 
preserving  the  rights  of  all  colonised  or  oppressed  people  to  secede  through  the 
exercise of the right to self-determination.
349 
There is a right to remedial secession for 
oppressed people, as set out in the Report of the International Committee of Jurists.
350
 
In the case of the Igbo people of Nigeria for instance, the Igbos suffered grave 
violations of human rights in the hands of the Nigerian State to warrant remedial 
secession  in  their  favour.  Secession,  however,  is  more  of  a  political  than  legal 
recourse, and any attempt by the Igbos to unilaterally secede without much 
international support may be an exercise in futility. Finally, membership of the United 
Nations, as seen from the research, is a conclusive proof of the evidence of 
independence and or secession of a country. However, lack of membership, does not 
ipso facto, lead to the conclusion that a country lacks independence, or that secession 
was unsuccessful. This is exemplified by the Kosovo scenario which successfully 
seceded from Serbia and is recognised by majority of members of the UN, although it 
lacks official recognition and membership of the UN. 
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